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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), as amended, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in not reinstating its 
October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order which compelled 
all Appellees to grant and otherwise resolve the issues presented 
in Appellants1 Requests for Agency Review. (See Exhibits "B", 
"Cn, "E", "U", and "V", Appendix hereto.) 
2. Whether Appellants had the right to seek and obtain 
an Extraordinary Writ and Order under Rule 65B from the district 
court — one which should not have later been secretly set aside 
under Rule 7(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, without either 
notice to Appellants or an opportunity to be heard. (Exhibit 
"R", App. hereto.) 
3. Whether a Utah district court has the power and 
authority to compel the Securities Division, a Utah government 
agency, to abide by its own agency rules and the UAPA. 
4. Whether Appellees committed contempt of the district 
court by ignoring its Extraordinary Writ and Order on October 30, 
1989, and hurriedly issuing an Order on Agency Review in 
violation thereof. If so, whether there is any relief or remedy 
presently available to Appellants for Appellees' contempt of the 
district court. (See Exhibits "E" and "H", App. hereto.) 
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5. Whether it is Constitutional for Securities Division 
Director John C. Baldwin to exercise investigatory and 
prosecutorial powers and, at the same, render judicial functions 
(as "presiding officer") by unilaterally, arbitrarily, hastily, 
and capriciously denying, on October 30, 1989, Appellants' 
Requests for Agency Review under §12, UAPA. (See Exhibits "D", 
"0", "H" and "I", Appendix hereto.) If such is unconstitutional, 
whether the district court erred in not dismissing the Division's 
amended petitions. (See Exhibit "S", App. hereto.) 
6. Whether the Securities Advisory Board, which was not 
engaged in investigatory and prosecutorial functions like 
Appellee Baldwin, should have acted as the "presiding officer" 
under §12 of the UAPA as opposed to Appellee Baldwin alone. In 
other words, did Baldwin (or the Division) commit contempt of the 
district court or otherwise violate the lower court's Writ and 
Order by unilaterally acting as "presiding officer" on October 
30, 1989. (See Exhibits "E", "F", and "H", App. hereto.) 
7. Whether §12 of the UAPA only contemplates "final 
agency action" as specifically provided in §14 of the UAPA, 
especially when neither §12 nor the corollary rule say such on 
their face. Whether §12 is identical to §14, UAPA, and therefore 
statutorily superfluous. 
8. Whether Appellants have any remedy or relief 
presently available to them for the Appellees1 violations of §12, 
UAPA, and the Department of Commerce corollary rule. 
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9• Whether it is Constitutional for Appellee Baldwin to 
continue to act as judge (i.e., agency director and "presiding 
officer") for purposes of reviewing any "final agency action" in 
this case. In other words, whether it is just and fair for 
"presiding officer" Baldwin to "sign off" on, modify, or approve 
the ultimate findings of the Securities Advisory Board in the on-
going administrative adjudicative proceedings. Whether someone 
unbiased and impartial (i.e., someone other than any of the 
Appellees) should act as "presiding officer" in the 
administrative adjudicative proceedings after October 30, 1989. 
10. Whether it is inherently prejudicial or 
unconstitutional for the prosecutor, the judge(s), jury, and 
executioners to be represented by the same counsel (i.e., the 
Attorney General) at the same time in the same administrative 
proceeding. If so, whether there is any remedy or relief 
presently available to Appellants for such blatant conflict of 
interest. 
11. Whether the Utah Securities Division has power and 
authority to enforce regulation against Appellants which is 
diametrically inconsistent with existing federal law, 
specifically, Appellants' contrary legal obligations under 
Article III, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice. (See Exhibits "K", 
"L", and "P", App. hereto.) Whether the NASD Rules of Fair 
Practice, in light of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-27, preempt Utah Code 
Ann. §61-l-6(l)(g) under the highly unusual facts and 
-3-
circumstances of this case. If so, whether the administrative 
adjudicate proceedings should be dismissed in their entirety. 
A. Standard of Review. The standard of review for each 
of the foregoing issues is simply whether the district court 
incorrectly applied the law or otherwise abused its discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The due process provisions of the federal Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, are determinative of 
this case. Specific reference is also made to the U.S. Supreme 
Court case of Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 95 
S.Ct. 1456 (1975), a significant administrative law decision 
which does not appear to have been cited in any previous Utah 
decision. This case also involves issues of federal preemption 
and reference is made to Point IV below, including this Court's 
decision in Western Capital & Securities, Inc. v. Kundsvig, 779 
P.2d 688, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, (Ut. Ct. of App. February 7, 
1989) [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep.(CCH) 194,337. 
Finally, Appellee Baldwin and the Attorney General's inherent 
(and continuing) conflicts of interest in the administrative 
proceedings relating to this appeal are issues having 
Constitutional implications. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the case. This case is one of first 
impression in Utah; it involves an interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12 (the "UAPA") and the corollary rule promulgated 
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by the Department of Commerce. It further involves a 
determination as to whether Appellantsf Constitutional rights 
were and are being violated by Appellees, thereby justifying 
complete dismissal of the administrative adjudicative 
proceedings. This case also involves a determination as to 
whether Appellees' violation of §12, UAPA, have prejudiced and 
otherwise violated Appellants' Constitutional rights to the 
extent of further justifying either dismissal of the existing 
administrative adjudicative proceedings or other comparable 
relief such as a new administrative trial before impartial 
judges. 
The Appellees have also raised issues as to whether the 
district court has jurisdiction to have heard Appellants' 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Thus, an additional issue is 
whether the district court erred in deciding — after the 
fact — that it lacked jurisdiction to compel Appellees not to 
act capriciously and arbitrarily with respect to Appellants. 
Finally, the most significant issue in these proceedings is 
whether the Division has jurisdiction to have brought the 
administrative adjudicative proceedings at all — proceedings 
entirely inconsistent, on their face, with Appellants' federal 
obligations under Art. Ill, §1 of the NASD Rules of Fair 
Practice. (See Exhibits "J", "K", and "S", App. hereto.) 
(b) Course of proceedings. Based on the district 
court's failure to reinstate its October 27, 1989, Extraordinary 
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Writ and Order, the administrative adjudicative proceedings have 
continued in violation of Appellants' Constitutional rights.1 
For example, on July 16, 1990, after nearly 1% years of 
relentless litigation, an administrat ive trial was held before 
the Securities Advisory Board. No ruling as a result of such 
hearing has been rendered to date. Yet the continuation of such 
administrative adjudicative proceedings after October 27, 1989, 
has been at great and substantial expense and damage to 
Appellants and had the district court and the ALJ not erred, such 
unlawful proceedings would not have continued. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
In April 1989, the Utah Division of Securities 
("Division") filed administrative adjudicative proceedings 
against Appellants seeking to revoke or suspend their securities 
brokerage licenses under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6. Such petitions 
were amended by the Division in July 1989 to delete one of three 
causes of action alleged against Appellants. In December 1989, 
the ALJ, in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion of Appellants, 
dismissed Count II of such amended petitions, a Division 
allegation that Appellantsf conduct violated so-called 
"suitability rules." This resulted in the amended petitions only 
stating a claim against Appellants for alleged "dishonest or 
unethical practices" under §61-1-6(1)(g). (Exhibits "M" and "S", 
l"Th1s naturally Includes Appellants' Constitutional rights under the Commerce Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §8(3) and §8(18). 
- 6 -
App. hereto.) In the amended petitions the Division alleges that 
simply buying securities from persons who lacked Utah exemptions 
from registration (no matter what the purpose) was a "dishonest 
or unethical practice" on the part of the buyers (i.e., 
Respondents). Because the Division's proceedings are legally and 
logically inconsistent with Appellants1 Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") and National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") obligations under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 19 34 and, because such are further inconsistent with a 
previous February 28, 1989, Order of U.S. District Judge J. 
Thomas Greene compelling Appellants to honor outstanding NASD 
contracts [R. 63; page 4, 110, Exhibit "T" and R. 33-34; p. 8-9, 
I's 15 and 16, Exhibit "J", App. hereto], Appellants filed a Rule 
12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss the Division's amended petitions. In 
such Motion, Appellants argued before the ALJ that the Division 
lacked jurisdiction to discipline them simply for complying with 
their obligations under federal law. Specifically, Appellants 
argued that the Division's amended petitions were repugnant to 
federal securities law as exclusively reserved to District Courts 
of the United States under §27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa. In other words, Article III, §1 of the 
NASD Rules of Fair Practice — which are, in turn, exclusively 
governed under §19(c) of the Exchange Act [Exhibit "K", 
App. hereto] — compels a broker-dealer to honor trades, whereas 
the Division's amended petitions sought to discipline 
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Appellants — at the same time — merely for honoring the very 
same trades. (See In re: Shaskan & Co., Inc., SEC Docket 775 
(May 28, 1976) and Friedman & Co., 45 SEC 393 (1973), both 
holding that broker-dealers can be disciplined and their licenses 
revoked under the NASD Rules of Fair Practice for failing to 
honor trades.) Simply put, the Division sought to discipline 
Appellants for doing something they were required to do under 
federal law (i.e., honoring outstanding NASD contracts previously 
entered into in interstate commerce with fellow out-of-state NASD 
member securities broker-dealers). (See Exhibit "J" and "Q", 
App. hereto.) As a result, Appellants are now being severely 
punished and otherwise placed in the impossible position of 
having had to comply at the same time with antithetical and 
diametrically conflicting regulation on the part of the NASD, on 
the one hand, and the Division, on the other. [Emphasis 
added.] Significantly, this preemption principle (i.e., that 
federal securities law supersedes state blue sky law (more 
especially with respect to broker-dealer regulation)) is 
specifically incorporated into Utah law in Utah Code 
Arm. §61-1-27. (See Exhibit "N", App. hereto.) This statute 
requires that the Utah Uniform Securities Act be interpreted in 
uniformity and consistently with federal law, of which the NASD 
Rules of Fair Practice necessarily have the same force and 
effect. (See, e.cj. , Exhibit "L", App. hereto and this Court's 
decision in Western Capital, supra.) With regard to this 
-8 -
argument, specific reference is made to pages 28-36 of the 
Record, Appellants1 "Statement of Material Facts" in t he i r Brief 
Supporting Agency Review,2 (Exhibit «j«, App. here to . ) 
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denied Appellants1 
R\ale 12(b)(1) Motion on August 29, 1989. (R. 72-76; Exhibit "A", 
App. hereto . ) As a r e su l t , on September 11, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, including the corol lary Department of 
Commerce Rule, Appellants timely f i led a Request for Agency 
Review of tha t order. (R. 8-12; Exhibit "B", App. hereto . ) 
Appellants further f i l ed , a l t e rna t ive ly , a Request for 
Certification of the ALJ's August 2$f Order as a "final agency 
act ion". (R. 19-20; Exhibit "C", App. hereto . ) Obviously, i f the 
Division e i ther lacks j u r i sd i c t i on or i t s action i s preempted as 
contemplated in Western Capital , th^re i s no legal basis for the 
existence of such administrative adjudicative proceedings. Thus, 
Appellants ' §12, UAPA, Request for Agency Review and a l t e rna t ive 
Request for Cer t i f ica t ion were more than reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
Between September 11, and October 27, 1989, Pet i t ioners 
h^ard nothing from the Division r e l a t ive to such Requests as 
spec i f ica l ly reguired of the Division under Department of 
Reference is further made to Exhibits "P" and "Q", Appendix hereto, copies of pertinent parts 
of §15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which exclusively governs self-regulatory 
securities organizations such as the NASD and, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7920, July 
19, 1966, 31 F.R. 10076, an SEC policy statement permitting consummation of securities 
transactions by broker-dealers when trading in a security Is suspended. This latter authority 
further confirms that the Division's amended petitions are Inconsistent on their face with 
federal law and policy. See Point IV below. 
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Commerce R151-46b-12. (R. 139, 163, 193-194; Exhibit "D", App. 
hereto.) Because an Order on Review was never issued as required 
under the Rule, Appellants, on October 27, 1989, filed an Ex 
Parte Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the Third Judicial 
District Court and obtained, on that same date, an Extraordinary 
Writ and Order directing the Respondents/Appellees to comply with 
the Division's own rules and either (1) grant the Appellants' 
Request for Agency Review and resolve all issues therein, oj: (2) 
certify the ALJ's August 29, 1989, Order as a "final agency 
action". (R. 91-92; Exhibit "E", App. hereto.) Such Order and 
Writ were served on each Appellee named herein no later than 
October 30, 1989, and in fact, 4 of the 5 Appellee/Securities 
Advisory Board Members were served by hand-delivery on October 
27, 1989. (R. 93-94; Exhibit "F", App. hereto.) 
On November 1, 1989, Appellees -- in apparent reliance 
on Rule 7(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure — secretly filed 
their own Ex Parte Counter-Petition with the district court and, 
without any notice to Appellants or their counsel, secretly 
induced the district court ex parte (and for reasons wholly 
unknown) to set aside its previously-entered Writ and Order of 
October 27, 1989. (R. 103-104; Exhibit "G", App. hereto,)3 The 
Apppellees' Counter-Petition, was then served on Appellants1 
T^his gives rise to another issue: If the Securities Advisory Board is and would be acting as 
Appellants' judge and jury after October 30, 1989 — which they did on July 16, 1990 -- how can 
the Securities Advisory Board members, in light of what has occurred herein, be able to act as 
impartial judges and jurors? 
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counsel the following day, namely, November 2, or, six (6) days 
after 4 of the named-Appellees were personally served with the 
district court's Writ and Order. In such Ex Parte 
Counter-Petition, Appellees boldly argue that the district court 
lacks jurisdiction to force Appellees to comply with the very 
rules governing the Division. (R. 105-112.) As per such Ex 
Parte Counter-Petition, the Appellees further acknowledge that 
they received and were all on actual notice of the district 
courtfs October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order by as 
early as October 30, 1989. Furthermore, the Appellees admit that 
on October 30, Appellee Baldwin, as "presiding officer" and in 
contempt of the same Writ and Order, hurriedly fashioned an Order 
On Agency Review dated October 30, 1989, an Order which 
unilaterally denied Appellants' Requests in all particulars. 
(R. 114-118, Ex. "H", App. hereto.) It is thus undisputed that 
the Appellees not only violated the district court's Order and 
Writ of October 27, but it is further undisputed that the 
Appellee Baldwin unilaterally deprived the entire Securities 
Advisory Board, certain named-Appellees herein, from 
participating in Baldwin's unilateral, arbitrary and capricious 
decision, all of which was contemptuous of the district court's 
October 27, Order and Writ compelling the contrary. (Exhibit 
"E", App. hereto.) It is thus further undisputed that Appellee 
Baldwin acted, has acted and will continue to act as "presiding 
officer", prosecutor, investigator, judge, jury and executioner 
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relative to the administrative proceedings direly affecting 
Appellants' livelihoods. This is because Mr. Baldwin not only 
signed the Order on Agency Review (acting as judge) but he also 
personally signed the Division's Motion to Convert the 
administrative proceedings from informal to formal (thereby also 
acting as prosecutor). (See Exhibits "H" and "I" in Appendix 
hereto, copies of Mr. Baldwin's remarkably convenient albeit 
contemptuous October 30, 1989, Order on Agency Review and his own 
Motion to Convert filed in the administrative adjudicative 
proceedings, respectively.) The foregoing is also not to ignore 
that Division Director Baldwin will continue to act as "presiding 
officer" (judge) in the remaining disposition of the 
administrative adjudicative proceedings. (See Exhibit "0", App. 
hereto.) 
On November 2, 1989, Appellants, as petitioners in the 
district court action, having had the rug surreptitiously pulled 
out from under them, filed a Motion to Reinstate the district 
court's October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order. 
(R. 144-145; Exhibit "U", App. hereto.) For reasons completely 
unknown, such was denied by the district court on January 23, 
1990. It can thus only be assumed that the district court denied 
Appellants' Motion to Reinstate because it subscribed to 
Appellees' erroneous argument that it lacks jurisdiction to have 
issued the October 27, Extraordinary Writ and Order in the first 
instance. On February 15, 1990, the district court certified its 
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January 23, 1990, ruling for appeal under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and this appeal has ensued. (R. 201-202; 
Exhibit "V", App. hereto.) 
Based on the Appellees1 intentional failure to honor the 
district court's Writ and Order, including Director Baldwin's 
obvious bias, conflict of interest, and failure to abide by his 
agency's own administrative rules, the administrative proceedings 
which pertain to this appeal have remained on-going for well over 
one (1) year at great and unjustified expense and damage to 
Appellants and their business and reputations. In fact, as a 
result of such unlawful and vicious proceedings, Appellant 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. has lost substantial income and has 
recently filed the necessary state and federal broker-dealer 
withdrawal forms ("BDW Forms") to cease doing business as a 
securities broker-dealer. As a direct consequence of the 
Division's amended petitions and the endless administrative 
adjudicative proceedings initiated by the Division to destroy it, 
Johnson-Bowles is now out-of-business. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Reference is made to Appellants1 Conclusion below. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT HAS POWER AND AUTHORITY TO 
HAVE ISSUED THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND ORDER OF 
OCTOBER 27, 1989, AND IT FURTHER HAS POWER AND 
AUTHORITY TO COMPEL A STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
TO ABIDE BY ITS OWN RULES, INCLUDING THE UAPA. 
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The lower court erroneously determined that under Rule 
65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the UAPA, it lacks 
jurisdiction to have issued its Extraordinary Writ and Order on 
October 27, 1989. (See Exhibits "D", "0", "R", "G", and "V", 
App. hereto.) This is not the law: The Utah Division of 
Securities is clearly an inferior tribunal or board of the Third 
Judicial District Court. Furthermore, there can be no dispute 
that the Division's director or its officers exercise judicial 
functions as contemplated in Rule 65B. Were the Division and its 
officers not engaged in judicial functions, both the on-going 
administrative adjudicative proceedings presently undertaken 
against Appellants and this very appeal would not exist. The 
Appellees unfortunately convinced the lower court that the 
Securities Division is only subject to direct regulation by the 
Utah Court of Appeals and that a Utah court of general 
jurisdiction has no authority or power ov€>r it in any respect or 
capacity. (R. 153-161.) The Division's arrogant and brazen 
belief is exemplified by the fact that it admits notice of the 
district court's October 27, 1989, Extraordinary Writ and Order, 
only to have had Appellee Baldwin hurriedly "hammer out" an 
October 30, Order on Agency Review in complete contempt thereof 
and only in an effort to fraudulently and disingenuously render 
the district court's Extraordinary Writ and Order moot. In their 
lower court memorandum, the Appellees quote §16 of the UAPA and 
§§78-2a-3, 78-3-4(5), Utah Code Ann., for the proposition that a 
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district court of Utah has no jurisdiction (or authority) to 
order a Utah administrative agency to do what it is required to 
do by law. (R. 156-157.) These statutes cited by the Appellees 
are irrelevant to the issues in this appeal. Such statutes 
solely contemplate "final agency action" and judicial, not 
agency, "appeals" from such "final agency action". The 
Appellants were never "appealing" anything to a Utah district 
court or the Utah Court of Appeals. For instance, the statute 
cited below by the Appellees relative to a Utah district court's 
appellate jurisdiction only relates to appeals of "informal 
proceedings". [Emphasis added.] Appellants were not seeking 
"appeal" of anything, merely "agency review" under §12 of the 
UAPA, or, alternatively, certification of the ALJ's Rule 12(b)(1) 
ruling for appeal.4 
It is noteworthy that had Appellants sought an 
extraordinary writ in the Court of Appeals under Rule 19 of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court of Appeals would have 
directed Appellants to seek the same in district court. Rule 
19(b)(5) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an 
explanation of why it would be "impractical or inappropriate" to 
have filed a petition for any such writ in the district court. 
Appellants would have had no explanation for such and therefore, 
they acted lawfully in seeking such in the district court on 
4Th1s 1s not to Ignore that the Appellees have never contested Appellants' "Statement of 
Material Facts" 1n their Supporting Memorandum before the district court. (R. 28-36, Exhibit 
"J", App. hereto.) 
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October 27, 1989. In short, since Appellants are not seeking 
"judicial appeal", but have merely sought to have the lower court 
order the Securities Division to have done that which it was 
required to do by law, having sought a writ from the Utah Court 
of Appeals would have been erroneous, embarrassing, and a waste 
of time and money. The case of Aluminum Company of America 
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (D.C. Ct. of App. May 10, 
1985) 761 F.2d 746, 245 U.S. App. D.C. 343, is directly on point. 
In Aluminum Company, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that the appropriate remedy for the ICCfs failure 
to comply with its own statutory deadlines in a railroad rate 
case is to seek and obtain, in district court, an order directing 
the ICC to act. [Emphasis added.] In further referring to the 
federal counterpart to §12 of the UAPA, the D.C. Court of Appeals 
said at p. 748: 
It follows from the structure of these 
provisions [the Administrative Procedure Act] 
that the remedy for the Commission's failure 
to comply with the statutory deadlines is the 
remedy which the petitioners sought and 
obtained in the District Court, an Order 
directing the Commission to act -- not the 
senseless remedy of cutting off the rights of 
a totally innocent appellant. [Emphasis 
added.] 
No case could be more on point. Furthermore, the statutory 
provision at issue in Aluminum Company, 5 USC §557(b)(1982), is 
the federal statute expressly involving "agency review" as in 
this case. It is further undisputed that §12 of the Utah 
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Administrative Procedures Act is patterned directly after the 
very provision of the federal Administrative Procedure Act in 
issue in Aluminum Company. Based on Aluminum Company, not only 
was it proper for Appellants to have sought an Extraordinary Writ 
in the district court, but to have not reinstated such Writ and 
Order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is reversible error. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S ORDER 
OF AUGUST 29, 1989, WAS "INTERLOCUTORY" OR "FINAL" 
IS IRRELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF §12 OF THE UAPA. 
It makes no difference under the law whether the ALJ!s 
order from which agency review is sought is "final". The lower 
court, however, erroneously concluded the contrary. To be sure, 
Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., by its own language, does not 
require that orders be "final". For this reason, there can be no 
dispute that under §12 of the UAPA it makes no difference what 
kind of order is involved in a Request for Agency Review. The 
Appellees, in their Ex Parte Counter-Petition, misled the 
district court by confusing §12 of the UAPA with §14 which does 
contemplate "final orders". In other words, if there is some 
obscure or secret Division policy whereby a request for agency 
review only involves "final orders", such has never been so 
publicized nor does the express language of §12 or the corollary 
Department of Commerce Rules say the same. As a consequence, 
Appellants have been severely prejudiced by the unilateral 
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interpretation that Appellees have given to such statute and the 
corollary agency rule which expressly applies to the Division. 
The Appellees have exclusively relied on the case of 
Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 118 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 68 
(Utah Ct. App., October 2, 1989) for the proposition that under 
§12 of the UAPA, an agency is not required to review anything but 
"final orders". The argument thus follows that because the 
Appellees secretly, capriciously and arbitrarily deemed the 
August 29, 1989, Order of the ALJ not to be a "final order" (as 
to anything), they did not have to review such under any 
circumstances. This is not what Sloan holds. Sloan merely 
involved an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals under §14 of the 
UAPA. In Sloan, the Court of Appeals only held that "an order of 
an agency is not final [for purposes of appeal, not agency 
review] so long as it reserves something to the agency for 
further decision". Sloan, supra at Adv. Rep. 68. On the other 
hand, the ALJ's Order from which Appellants seek agency review 
only involves whether or not the Division has jurisdiction to 
have brought the on-going administrative adjudicative proceedings 
in issue. There is nothing in such Order which reserves anything 
to the ALJ or anyone else for further decision on the issue of 
jurisdiction. Yet what could be more "final" than the conferring 
of jurisdiction? For this reason, Appellants submit that the 
Order from which review was sought was "final" under Sloan even 
though finality is irrelevant under both §12 of the UAPA and the 
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Division's own rule further interpreting the same. Simply put, 
the Appellees1 argument by which they secretly induced the 
district court to err and hastily set aside its Oct. 27, Writ and 
Order — as if Appellants somehow acted improperly — is itself 
false and erroneous. 
It is also grossly vague under the §12 of the UAPA 
whether or not Appellee Baldwin, the ALJ and/or the Securities 
Advisory Board is the "presiding officer". The statute is 
totally ambiguous in this regard, particularly when, in the on-
going administrative proceedings, two different people, including 
the ALJ, in addition to Appellee Baldwin have executed pleadings 
as the so-called "presiding officer". Since this issue is 
unclear, the Court's Writ and Order of October 27, which 
specifically designated Appellee Baldwin and the Securities 
Advisory Board as the "presiding officer", at least gives all 
parties direction and otherwise prevents the Appellees from 
further capriciously and arbitrarily doing what they in fact did 
on October 30. For this reason, the Appellees abused their own 
discretion and have prejudiced Appellants in hurriedly and 
contemptuously appointing Director Baldwin, as late as Oct. 30, 
as the "presiding officer", merely for the purpose of issuing the 
October 30, 1989, Order on Agency Review to further render 
Appellants' lower court Petition moot — an Order only designed 
to capriciously and arbitrarily deprive Appellants of any right 
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or ability they and the Securities Advisory Board might have had 
to get the Division's unlawful proceedings disposed of summarily. 
Department of Commerce Rule R151-46b-12, D, ORDER ON 
REVIEW — a rule which necessarily governs the Division 
— requires that any written order on review shall issue within 
20 days after the filing of any response. (Exhibit "D", 
App. hereto.) In this case, the Division filed its response to 
Appellants' September 26, 1989, Request well after 20 days had 
long expired. Because the Division clearly violated its own 
agency rules, this Court should hold, if nothing else, that 
Appellees granted Appellants' Requests by default. (Exhibits "B" 
and "C", App. hereto.) For this reason alone, this Court should 
confirm the Division's legal obligation to adhere and abide by 
its own rules and make a determination of how and to what extent 
Appellants have been prejudiced by the Division's intentional 
failures in that regard. If an agency can violate its own rules 
any time it wants, what good are such rules other than to mislead 
and deprive those similarly situated to Appellants with due 
process of law. 
The district court, in denying the motion to reinstate, 
held that §12 of the UAPA only contemplates "final agency 
action". As a consequence, it further erroneously ruled that 
there is no distinction between §12 and §14 of the UAPA. If the 
lower court is correct, then §12, UAPA, is a statutory 
superfluity and has no reason to exist. To be sure, if an agency 
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order is indeed "final", an aggrieved party would simply appeal 
under §14. Thus, if the lower court is correct and §12 and §14 
are to be interpreted identically, there would never be a 
legitimate reason for a person to invoke or rely on §12. This is 
not to ignore that §12, by its own unambiguous language only 
contemplates an agency "order" and Department of Commerce Rule 
R151-46b-12, §12's corollary, similarly only contemplates an 
"order entered in a formal adjudicative proceeding". For these 
reasons, the lower courtfs conclusion that §12 and R1511-46b-l2 
only contemplate "final" orders is plainly wrong. In addition, 
based on Sloan, which exclusively involves an interpretation of 
§14 of the UAPA, the order sought review of in this case may 
indeed be "final". This is because there is nothing further for 
the Securities Division or the ALJ to have decided relative to 
jurisdiction. In fact, it is impossible to imagine how the 
August 29, 1989, Order could be more "final" when its effect 
allows the Division to continue to proceed against Appellants 
unlawfully. Nonetheless, if §12 of the UAPA and Rule 151-46b-12 
of the Department of Commerce only contemplate "final orders", 
then such statute and the corollary rule should so say. The 
Appellees certainly have no authority to unilaterally interpret 
such laws and rules for their own benefit for the "senseless 
remedy of cutting off the rights of a totally innocent 
appellant". Aluminum Company, supra at 748. Yet, this is 
exactly what Appellees, their counsel, and the district court 
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have done. Appellants spent a lot of time, energy, and 
attorney's fees preparing their Requests for Agency Review only 
to have Appellee Baldwin arbitrarily and capriciously deny their 
Requests on October 30, and only after his personal receipt of 
the district court!s Extraordinary Writ and Order directing him 
and the Securities Advisory Board to do the opposite. [Emphasis 
added.] If this is also not contempt of the district court, then 
the word "contempt" surely has no meaning, at least in this 
jurisdiction. 
POINT III 
IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR APPELLEE 
BALDWIN TO ACT AS INVESTIGATOR, PROSECUTOR, 
JUDGE, JURY AND EXECUTIONER AT THE SAME 
TIME IN THE SAME PROCEEDING, AND THEREFORE, 
APPELLEE BALDWIN'S ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW 
DATED OCTOBER 30, 1989, SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SET ASIDE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
SHOULD NOW BE DISMISSED. IT IS ALSO HIGHLY 
PREJUDICIAL FOR THE PROSECUTOR AND JUDGE(S) 
TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE SAME COUNSEL AT THE SAME TIME. 
It is undisputed that John C. Baldwin, Director of the 
Division of Securities, has acted as "prosecutor" in having 
signed Division pleadings in the on-going administrative 
adjudicative proceedings. For instance, Appellee Baldwin 
personally executed the Division's Motion to Convert the 
administrative proceedings in issue from informal to formal. 
(Exhibit "I", App. hereto.) It is also undisputed that 
Director Baldwin has simultaneously acted as "judge" in drafting 
and signing the Order on Agency Review. (R. 114-118; Exhibit 
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"H", App. hereto.) In addition, during the remainder of the 
on-going administrative proceedings, Mr. Baldwin will continue to 
act as judge ("presiding officer") of Appellants under the UAPA. 
In this context, there is a plethora of authority in 
administrative law that it is unconstitutional for a person to 
serve as investigator, prosecutor, and judge in the same 
administrative proceeding. Withrow v. Larkin, supra. In 
Withrow, Justice White, writing for a unanimous U.S. Supreme 
Court, stated: 
Cases in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary 
interest in the outcome and in which he has 
been the target of personal abuse or criticism 
from the party before him are situations where 
the probability of actual bias on the part of 
the judge or decision-maker is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable under due process 
of law. 
Justice White went on to say: 
To carry its burden of persuasion, the 
contention that the combination of 
investigative and adjudicative functions 
necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk 
of bias in administrative adjudication must 
overcome a presumption of honesty and 
integrity in those serving as adjudicators, 
and it must convince that, under a realistic 
appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness, conferring investigative and 
adjudicative powers on the same individuals 
poses such a risk of actual bias or 
prejudgment that the practice must be 
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is 
to be adequately implemented. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Withrow at L.Ed. 723-24. The on-going administrative 
adjudicative proceedings have been heated; harsh criticisms have 
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also been leveled by Appellants at the Division, including 
Appellee Baldwin. The Division has also sought (as a condition 
of settlement) to unlawfully extract a $510,000 fine from 
Appellants in order to extort them into capitulation and 
therefore, Director Baldwin certainly has a pecuniary iaterest in 
filling his agencyfs own administrative pockets at AppeLlants' 
expense. (R. 35; Exhibit "J", App. hereto.) Based on Withrow 
and Appellee Baldwinfs direct prosecutorial and adjudicative 
participation in the on-going administrative proceedings, it is 
an unconstitutional denial of due process to have permitted 
Appellee Baldwin to arbitrarily and capriciously deny Appellants1 
September 11, 1989 Requests for either \Agency Review and/or for 
Certification. (R. 114-118; Exhibit "H,f, App. hereto.) From a 
more technical standpoint, it is unconstitutional that Appellee 
Baldwin could have appointed himself as "presiding officer" under 
§12 UAPA when he and his agency have an interest in the outcome 
in their favor, when they would surely relish a $50,000 "capital 
contribution" to their budget, when they themselves drafted the 
instant administrative petitions, when they issued the order 
denying agency review, when they will continue to prosecute and 
judge Appellants, and when they have further been direct targets 
of harsh criticism from Appellants. Therefore, as a matter of 
law, the probability of actual bias on the part of Appellee 
Baldwin as prosecutor and judge of his own petitions against 
Appellants is clear and such is unconstitutional. For these 
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reasons, Baldwin's arbitrary and capricious Order, hastily, 
haphazardly, and conveniently denying Appellants1 Requests on 
October 30, should be set aside in its entirety and the 
administrative adjudicative proceedings should now be dismissed 
as unconstitutional and unfair. (That the foregoing 
Constitutional issues were indeed before the lower court is 
evidenced by pages 186-188 of the Record.) 
Furthermore, the Attorney General is in the malignantly 
preposterous position of representing the Division, Director 
Baldwin, the "presiding officer", and the entire Securities 
Advisory Board at the same time. It is thus evident that there 
is no distinction in this case between the prosecutors, the 
investigators, the judges, jury, and the executioners. For this 
reason alone, the on-going administrative adjudicative 
proceedings are unconstitutional and unfair on their face in that 
all such parties clearly have a unity of interest — an interest 
quite adverse to that of Appellants. Because the adjudication of 
Appellants1 interests in these proceedings can be neither 
impartial nor protected, this Court should rule that Appellees 
have a blatant conflict of interest and, as a consequence, none 
of them can lawfully sit in judgment of Appellants. It should 
thus dismiss the Division's amended petitions with prejudice. 
POINT IV 
THE DIVISION LACKS JURISDICTION TO HAVE 
BROUGHT THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST APPELLANTS AND THEREFORE, 
THIS COURT SHOULD ISSUE A DECISION DISMISSING 
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SUCH PROCEEDINGS IN THEIR ENTIRETY. 
The Division lacks jurisdiction to discipline Appellants 
in a manner regulatorily inconsistent with superseding federal 
law. Under the law, Appellants, as members of the NASD, have 
unambiguous federal obligations to honor outstanding Exchange Act 
contracts in securities they have traded with other NASD members. 
By way of background, the Division suspended exemptions in Utah 
for the offer and sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock on 
March 1, 1989. (Exhibit "T", App. hereto.) In an effort to 
honor previous contracts for the sale of U.S.A. Medical stock 
entered into by Appellant Johnson-Bowles prior to March 1, 1989, 
Johnson-Bowles purchased sufficient U.S.A. Medical stock to 
consummate such federal, Exchange Act contracts. [Emphasis 
added.] At the same time, Appellants undertook such to comply 
with U.S. District Judge J. Thomas Greene!s February 28, 1989, 
denial of their motion for preliminary injunction, a federal 
ruling which necessarily required Appellants to honor such 
outstanding Exchange Act contracts. (R. 3 3; I's 15 and 16, 
Exhibit "J", App. hereto.) In this regard, it is undisputed that 
the Division's Summary Order of March 1, 1989, does not prohibit 
the "purchase" of U.S-A* Medical stock for any purpose. (R. 
60-64; Exhibit "T", App. hereto). Furthermore, the SEC has 
clearly carved out an exception in this very situation which 
specifically allows the consummation of securities transactions 
by broker-dealers during a suspension of trading order. (R. -65; 
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Exhibit "Q", App. hereto.) However., as a result of how the 
Division ignorantly misinterprets its own power and authority 
vis-a-vis federal securities regulation, the Division brought the 
instant administrative adjudicative proceedings against 
Appellants. For instance, in such July 1989 amended petitions, 
the Division basically alleges that Appellants should have 
ignored their federal obligations, including U.S. District Judge 
Greene's ruling, and that Appellants1 good faith purchases of 
U.S.A. Medical stock simply to deliver the same to fellow 
out-of-state NASD member broker-dealers and clearing corporations 
(not Utah residents) was a "dishonest or unethical practice" as 
contemplated in Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g). (See Exhibit "S", 
App. hereto, a true and correct copy of the Division's Amended 
Petitions in issue.) 
Accordingly, the Division seeks to discipline Appellants 
merely for complying with federal law, all as if the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act somehow magically preempts federal securities law, 
more especially the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Because of 
this diametrically conflicting regulation on the part of the 
Division, which no respectable business person on earth should 
have to tolerate, Appellants so moved the ALJ under Rule 12(b)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an order dismissing the 
Division's amended petitions on the grounds of jurisdiction and 
federal preemption. It is the ALJ's August 29, 1989, erroneous 
denial of such motion which gave rise to the Requests for Agency 
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Review directly in issue. Without belaboring this Brief more 
particularly in this regard, reference is made to pages 26-89 in 
the lower court record, true and correct copies of Appellants1 
Supporting and Reply Memorandums in support of their Requests for 
Agency Review. In the interests of judicial economy, this Court 
has an obligation to address the propriety of the Division's 
underlying jurisdiction, including the preemption issue, only 
because it is the underlying basis of this appeal. See R. 26-76; 
Exhibit "J", Appendix hereto, a true and correct copy of 
Appellants1 Brief in Support of their Request for Agency Review. 
CONCLUSION 
When a statute establishes a specific scheme for 
obtaining review, courts are to assume that such set of 
procedures is exclusive. Central Lincoln Peoples1 Utility 
District v. Johnson, (9th Cir. 1984) 735 F.2d 1101, 1109; Nader 
v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Since the Division 
has violated its own internal agency rule, this Court must 
properly interpret §12 and the corollary agency rule. This Court 
should further decide the Constitutional issues wholly ignored by 
the district court — issues ignored only because the district 
court erroneously held that it lacks jurisdiction to have 
entertained any of that which was before it. In the meantime, 
because the administrative adjudicative proceeding procedures in 
issue have already proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, 
there is no reason why this Court should delay and not further 
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decide the merits of Appellants1 Requests for Agency Review. The 
merits of the ALJfs August 29, 1989, Order is thus ripe for 
review by this Court. Such will also dispense with a second 
appeal of the entire administrative adjudicative proceedings 
which will no doubt be forthcoming in the event this Court fails 
to address the underlying merits of this appeal• 
Appellants filed their Requests for Agency Review only 
because they believed that the Division lacked jurisdiction to 
discipline Appellants in a manner diametrically inconsistent with 
the mandates of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 — a federal 
Act which directly regulates Appellants in their capacities as a 
securities broker-dealer and agent. The Division did nothing 
within 20 days as required by the rule and yet on the day it 
received the Writ and Order of the district court directing it to 
grant and review Appellants' Requests, Director Baldwin 
hurriedly, arbitrarily and capriciously denied such Requests in 
contempt of the district court. As this Court can see from 
Appellants' Requests [R. 8-12, 19-20, 26-89; Exhibits "B" and 
ffC", App. hereto ], there are substantial grounds upon which the 
on-going administrative proceedings should have been dismissed in 
their entirety. This is so regardless of the constitutional 
deprivations subsequently imposed by Mr. Baldwin and the Attorney 
General through their blatantly conflicting and prejudicial 
roles. 
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Based on the foregoing, this court should grant 
Appellants the following relief: (1) it should hold that the 
district court has jurisdiction to have entertained Appellants1 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ directing Appellees, together as 
"presiding officer", to either grant Appellants1 Requests or 
certify the ALJfs order as "final"; (2) it should hold that 
Appellees committed contempt of the district court by ignoring 
the Extraordinary Writ and Order on October 30, 1989; (3) it 
should hold that the district court erred in not granting 
Appellants1 Motion to Reinstate; (4) it should determine to what 
extent Appellants have been prejudiced (or are now damaged) by 
the Appellees' conduct, what relief is now available to 
Appellants, if any, and whether it was fair and constitutional to 
have allowed the Securities Advisory Board Appellees to sit in 
judgment of Appellants on July 16, 1990; (5) it should further 
decide the Constitutional issues involving Baldwin (and the 
entire Securities Advisory Board) that the district court wholly 
ignored and thus determine whether the administrative proceedings 
should now be dismissed as unconstitutional; (6) it should make a 
determination as to the effect of the Attorney General's blatant 
conflict of interest; (7) it should decide that Director Baldwin 
be prohibited from acting in the future as appellate judge 
relative to any forthcoming "final agency action"; (8) it should 
decide who is unbiased and impartial enough to rule on any 
forthcoming "final agency action"; and (9) it should fully 
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address the overall merits of Appellants1 Requests and determine 
whether the Division does indeed have jurisdiction to discipline 
Appellants for reasons diametrically at odds with the mandates of 
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. At a minimum, Appellants are 
entitled to a determination as to whether the Securities Division 
either lacks jurisdiction or is preempted from having brought the 
administrative adjudicative proceedings [Exhibit "S", App. 
hereto] and whether such proceedings were and have been pursued 
unlawfully. (See Western Capital, supra, holding that state 
courts have no jurisdiction to interpret NASD Rules.) 
Accordingly, this Court should decide whether the administrative 
adjudicative proceedings should have been (or should now be) 
dismissed in their entirety with prejudice. 
The Appellees' position in this case is unfounded and 
unsupported by the irrelevant authority cited by them in the 
court below. Even 5 U.S.C. §557(b)(1982), the portion of the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act on which §12 of the UAPA is 
based, does not exclusively contemplate "final orders". This is 
also not to lose sight of the fact that the ALJfs Order of August 
29, 1989, could not be more "final" from a procedural standpoint, 
a standpoint which §12, UAPA, was designed to address. Moreover, 
it is unconstitutional for Baldwin to wear an investigator, 
prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner's hat which he has done, 
is doing, and will continue to do throughout not only the 
on-going administrative proceedings, but in future administrative 
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adjudicative proceedings. Simply put, Director Baldwin has no 
business wearing every conceivable regulatory hat imaginable at 
the same time. In fac t , how many hats i s one person en t i t l ed to 
wear and what hat could Baldwin wear tha t he has not worn, i s not 
already wearing, or wi l l not wear in the future?5 Furthermore, 
how many persons pa r t i c ipa t ing in the ins tan t administrat ive 
adjudicative proceedings i s the Attorney General en t i t l ed to 
represent , to what extent , in what capac i t i e s , and for what 
purposes? 
Based on the foregoing, the d i s t r i c t court erred in 
concluding tha t i t lacks j u r i sd i c t i on over Appellants1 Pe t i t ion 
for Extraordinary Writ. In the i n t e r e s t s of j u d i c i a l economy and 
fa i rness , t h i s Court should address a l l of these issues and even 
go further and determine whether the Divis ion 's amended pe t i t i ons 
are and were cons t i tu t iona l and/or consis tent with pr inc ip les of 
federal preemption. Such a determination would be d i spos i t ive of 
the en t i r e administrat ive adjudicative proceedings in tha t i f the 
Division lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n , the amended pe t i t i ons f i led against 
Appellants should never have e i ther been i n i t i a t e d or allowed to 
proceed to a formal hearing — a l l a t great and unjus t i f ied 
expense to the taxpayers and Appellants — af ter nearly VA years 
5The Court should note that because the administrative adjudicative proceedings went to a full 
hearing on July 16, 1990, before the Securities Advisory Board, Appellee Baldwin, as director and 
"presiding officer", will get but another chance to judge Appellants. This 1s because Appellants 
understand that under the UAPA, Mr. Baldwin must "sign off" or approve the Securities Advisory 
Board's decision with respect to Appellants' licenses. Appellants believe and assert that this 
1s again unfair and only bolsters their argument that Mr. Baldwin's role 1n both prosecuting and judging them at the same time 1s severely prejudicial and unconstitutional. 
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of bitter and protracted litigation. This Court should thus 
reverse the district court, address issues it ignored, and 
dismiss the Division's amended petitions on either constitutional 
or jurisdictional (preemption) grounds. 
Finally, the Division violated its own internal rules 
governing agency review and therefore, the Requests in issue, 
even if arguably discretionary on the part of the Division, were 
granted by default. Certainly, agency rules are of no value if 
an agency can violate them willy-nilly and with impunity. 
Because the law on §12 of the UAPA is unclear, Appellants are 
entitled to an appropriate ruling of this Court to prevent future 
misinterpretation and discrimination under §12, UAPA. Certainly 
the Division had nothing to lose by having granted Appellants' 
Requests and all parties clearly had something to gain if indeed 
the Division lacks jurisdiction to have brought the 
administrative adjudicative proceedings in issue. 
DATED this^ day of August, ^990, 
Michael Coombs 
:raig F. McCullough 
(Attorneys for Appellants 
PROOF OF SERVICE . 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the *C—day of 
August, 1990, (s)he hand-delivered four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Mark J. Griffin, 
Attorney for Appellees, 115 State C^pi^ol Building, Salt, Lak/ 
City, Utah 84114. 
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EXHIBIT "A 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
In the Matter of the Registration of : ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. : 
CRD No. 07678 : Case No. SD-89-46BD 
In the Matter of the Registration of : 
Marten Vernon Johnson : Case No. SD-89-47AG 
CRD No. 2598888 : 
Appearances: 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
By Motion, dated July 3,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative 
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto was filed by the Division on July 13,1989. On the 
just-stated date. Respondents also filed an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss. 
Oral argument on the pending motion was conducted on July 14,1989, at which time Respondents 
filed a reply memorandum and copies of six (6) letters relative thereto. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is a securities broker and Respondent Marten 
Vernon Johnson is a securities agent and principil of the just-named company. Respondents are duly 
registered by the Division of Securities of the Stmt of Utah. 
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2. By Summary Order, dated March 1,1989, the Division denied the availability of all 
transactional exemptions relative to the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation. The Summary Order has 
been in effect on a continuous basis since the just-stated date. 
3. Prior to entry of the March 1,1989 Summary Order, Respondent Johnson, as an agent and 
principal for Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., had effected transactions in the securities of 
U.S A. Medical Corporation. Sparing detail, outstanding contracts existed between Respondent Johnson-
Bowles Company, Inc. and various third panics respecting the sale of the securities in question by 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. to those third parties. Specifically, said contracts existed prior 
to issuance of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. 
4. Given the just-described contracts, and in order to effect the delivery of the securities in question 
to various third parties, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., through Respondent Marlen Vernon 
Johnson, purchased approximately 364,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock from seven (7) 
individuals between April 3,1989 and April 13,1989. Respondents were aware of the March 1,1989 
Summary Order when the just-described purchases were made. 
5. On April 27,1989, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action and Petition, wherein it was 
alleged that Respondents had willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 
Summary Order and that they had engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business. 
Pursuant to an Amended Petition, dated July 19,1989, the Division has withdrawn the allegation that 
Respondents had either willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 Summary 
Order. However, based on the allegation that Respondents have engaged in dishonest or unethical practices 
in the securities business, the Division seeks entry of an order suspending or revoking the respective 
registration of Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents assert that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction to initiate the instant 
proceeding and to enter any disciplinary sanction as to their existing registration. Specifically, Respondents 
contend that rules of conduct promulgated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
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required that they complete their existing contracts by cither payment or delivery of the securities in 
question. Respondents further contend that compliance with that directive prompted their purchase of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities from certain Utah residents subsequent to the issuance of the March 
1,1989 Summary Order and that said Order prohibited only the sale, but not the purchase, of the just-stated 
securities. In essence. Respondents urge that the pertinent NASD rules of conduct promulgated pursuant to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 necessarily supercede the operation of the March 1,1989 Summary 
Order and, thus, the instant proceeding should be dismissed. 
During oral argument on the pending motion, counsel for Respondents extensively addressed those 
rules of conduct which govern NASD members and whether Respondents could have been subject to 
disciplinary sanction regarding their membership in that organization for any failure to comply with said 
rules. In rejoinder, counsel for the Division has urged that Respondents could have fulfilled their 
contractual obligations to third parties by means other than a purchase of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities, but that it was financially advantageous for Respondents to act as they did. The Division has 
also asserted that Respondents solicited the sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and that any such 
solicitation is relevant to whether Respondents engaged in dishonest and unethical securities practices. 
Notwithstanding the belabored arguments which were presented as to the foregoing matters, the 
operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order was to prevent the sale of unregistered securities to 
Utah residents. Both parties concede that those securities had been the subject of market manipulation and 
sccuriues fraud. Under such circumstances, issuance of the Summary Order was clearly intended to preclude 
any subsequent sale of diosc securities within this state. 
With knowledge of the existence of the Summary Order, Respondents purchased said securities 
from certain Utah residents. In so doing, Respondents* conduct effectively frustrated the attempts of the 
Division to preclude the trading of those unregistered securities. Whether Respondents solicited the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it is 
obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of those securities facilitated a violation 
of the Summary Order as to potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings. 
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Respondents' assertion that NASD rules of conduct should be accorded the force and effect of federal 
law, as to thus obviate compliance with the March 1,1989 Summary Order, is not well-founded. 
Concededly, had Respondents owned the securities prior to March 1,1989 and merely delivered those 
securities to third parties after the Summary Order had been issued, such a ministerial act may not have 
exposed Respondents to possible revocation or suspension of their registration. However, Respondents' 
purchase of the securities after March 1,1989 to effect their subsequent delivery of those securities to third 
parties was squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. Simply put, 
any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as a member of that self-regulatory 
organization does not lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in 
this case. 
Two further matters should be addressed. Both parties have noted certain aggravating and/or 
mitigating factors in this case and have urged that such factors should be considered relative to the merits of 
the pending motion. Without doubt, such circumstances are relevant as to any possible entry of a 
disciplinary sanction at some subsequent stage in these proceedings. However, those factors are not 
germane to the matter presently before the Court 
Respondents have also requested that any order denying the pending motion be certified as "final", 
so that necessary review of that order can be sought Section 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended, provides that parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek review "of an order by the agency" 
and sets forth the procedure to obtain any such review. R151-46b-12(A) is further applicable in that 
respect Presumably, Respondents' request that any order issued on the pending motion be certified as final 
is one directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides: 
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. (fill 
emphasis herein added). 
It is not wiihin the province of this Court to decided whether the order set forth below is "final", as to allow 
for subsequent judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for purposes of such review. 
However, the order herein is subject to agency review, as set forth above. 
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ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss the July 19,1989 
Amended Petition is denied. 
Dated this <2jL?Z_d2y of August, 1989. 
j£/Cjteven Eklund 
unistrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 1 have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying 
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott 
Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to 
Mark J. Griffin. Assistant Attorney General for tfie Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation 
Division. 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Dated this C N ? ^ day of August, 1989. 
QOOl? 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
EXHIBIT J j ^ l L . 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION : 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON : 
CRD NO. 2598888 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in accordance with §63-46b-12. Utah Code Ann., 
and/or R151-46b-12(A) of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings Before the 
Department of Business Regulation. Respondents hereby request agency or superior agency 
review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order dated August 29, 1989. a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Respondents' Exhibit 
"A". Respondents further request oral argument in accordance therewith. This Request is 
timely filed in that Respondents' counsel did not receive the August 29. Order until August 
31. 1989. 
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Respondents' grounds for requesting agency or superior agency review and 
oral argument thereon include but are not limited to the following: 
(1) the Court's August 29.1989. Order. Exhibit "A" hereto, is non-responsive to 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and erroneously treats Respondents' 
motion as a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as argued at the hearing by the Division; 
(2) the Order contains erroneous, superfluous, and irrelevant findings of fact 
and conclusions of law relative to Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion and otherwise assumes 
facts neither pleaded, admitted, nor in evidence and which otherwise improperly tend to go 
to the merits of the Division's case; 
(3) the Order erroneously compels the necessary legal conclusion that it would 
have been possible for Respondents, as Utah residents, to have complied with their federal 
NASD and SEC obligations, either themselves or by allowing -buy-ins- for their -own 
account-, without violating the Division's unilateral and capricious interpretation of its own 
March 1. Order; 
(4) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law in concluding that the Division 
has been delegated power and authority (i.e.. jurisdiction) to issue orders, unilaterally 
interpret them, and thereby discipline an NASD member merely for obeying and complying 
with superseding and pre-emptive federal securities law — -state action- further repugnant 
to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution in that Congress has 
expressly delegated enforcement and interpretation of an NASD and SEC duty, liability, or 
obligation to the federal courts under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 
(5) the Order could not be more erroneous as a matter of law in concluding on 
page 4 that NNASD rules . . . should not be accorded the force and effect of federal law.. . 
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(6) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division's March 1. 1989 
Order — which says nothing of prohibiting -purchases" — quite literally supersedes and 
overrides federal securities law specifically governed under the Exchange Act and over 
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction; 
(7) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law insofar as it concludes that the 
Division, in light of 128(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. can inconsistently regulate and 
even discipline federal licensees contrary to express mandates of federal law. specifically. 
that the Division can deem an act "unethical" when the preemptive federal regulatory 
scheme declares the very same act "ethical"; 
(8) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division can give unlawful 
extra-territorial effect to its Order of March 1 and otherwise give such Order a predatory 
and discriminatory effect on Respondents; and 
(9) the August 29. 1989 Order is erroneous in not concluding that the 
Division's Amended Petitions are barred by pre-emption under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and otherwise repugnant to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the 
Constitution. 
Respondents have the right to seek agency review of the August 29. Order and 
otherwise exhaust their administrative remedies in that if the Division lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction, which it does, these entire proceedings are unlawful and a waste of all parties' 
time, energy, and money, particularly when such proceedings have already subjected and 
continue to subject Respondents to substantial damages. Respondents further have a right 
to seek agency review of the Order of August 29. because it is not a "non-final procedural 
ruling" of the Division. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Commission, 
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433 F.2d 524, 526 (D.C.Cir. 1970). See also Ecee, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission, 526 
F.2d 1270, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert, dented, 429 U.S. 866. 97 S.Ct. 176. 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976); 
Coca-Cola Company v. Federal Trade Commission. 475 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.). cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 877. 94 S.Ct. 121. 38 LEd.2d 122 (1973). 
Based on the foregoing and §63-46b-12(1)(b)(ii), Utah Code Ann., Respondents 
pray for immediate reversal of the August 29,1989 Order and for an Order declaring that 
the Division has no jurisdiction to either unilaterally interpret its March 1. 1989 Order 
inconsistently with federal securities law or otherwise bring a revocation proceeding 
against an NASD member merely for obeying, complying, or attempting to comply with 
superseding Exchange Act rules and regulations. 
In accordance with applicable Department of Commerce rules. Respondents 
herewith file a Brief in support of their grounds for review. The parties seeking review 
further sign this Request as required under §63-46(b)-12(b)(i). Utah Code Ann. 
Respondents further hereby give notice that the Division shall have fifteen (15) days from 
the date of its receipt hereof to file a responsive pleading if it so desires. 
DATED this / / ctyof September, 1/ 
Coombs 
^Attorney for Respondents 
JOHNSON-BOWLES. COMPANY, INC., 
Respondent 
Its: President 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of September. 1989, 
(s)he hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR AGENCY 
REVIEW AND REQUEST FOR HEARING to John C. Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C. McGinley. 
Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division. Utah Department of Commerce. 160 
East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802: Administrative Law Judge 
and presiding officer J. Stephen Eklund. Esq., Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 
South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; and mailed the same to Mark J. 
Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 State Capitol. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114; and 
Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. of Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th 
Floor. Kennecott Bldg., 10 East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City, Utah 84133. 
J:REQUEST.2-3 ( ) 
- 5 - 00013 
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EXHIBIT _ J 2 L -
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION 
OF AUGUST 29. ORDER AS A 
"FINAL AGENCY ACTION" 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
In the event the Court, the Securities Advisory Board, the Executive Director. 
Presiding Officer, or other appellate body, denies Respondents a request for agency or 
superior agency review under 863-46b-12. Utah Code Ann., and/or the applicable agency 
rules promulgated thereunder. Respondents herewith request certification of the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29.1989 as a "final agency action" as 
contemplatecl in §63-46b-14<1). Utah Code Ann. In the alternative. If the agency or superior 
agency denies Respondents' request for certification of such Order as a "final agency 
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action*1. Respondents pray for an order declaring that Respondents' have exhausted all of 
the administrative remedies available to them with respect to whether the Division has 
subject-matter jurisdiction as contemplated In S63-46b-14(2)(a). Utah Code Ann. 
In the alternative. Respondents pray that the agency or superior agency's order 
with respect to this request be itself certified as a "final agency action** as contemplated in 
§63-46b-14(1). Utah Code Ann. 
DATED this 11th day of September. } 
Jfchn Michael Coombs 
attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of September. 1989. 
(s)he hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR 
CERTIFICATION OF ORDER AS A "FINAL AGENCY ACTION** to John C. Baldwin. Director and 
Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division. Utah 
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and presiding officer J. Stephen Eklund. Esq.. 
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.d. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; and mailed the same to Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 
State Capitol. Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan. 
& Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor. Kennecott Bldg.. 10 East South Temple 
Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 8413° 
J:REQUEST.1 
- 2 -
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EXHIBIT "D" 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION 
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1,1988 
PROMULGATED PURSUANT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
(SECTION 63-46b-l ct. seq.) 
AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT 
(SECTION 63-46a-l ct. seq.) 
EXHIBIT. "A 1 / 
COiSo 
R151-46b-12 Agency Review. 
A. FILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW. 
A request for agency review may be filed within ten days after the 
issuance of findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order entered in a 
formal adjudicative proceeding or the issuance of the order in an informal 
adjudicative proceeding. Said petition shall be filed with the agency head 
of the division in which the matter originated. Any brief in support of the 
grounds for review shall be concurrently filed with the request for agency 
review. Any response to the request for agency review, including any brief 
in support thereof, shall also be filed with the agency head within fifteen 
days of the mailing of the request for review. 
B. EFFECT OF FILING. 
Upon the timely filing of a request for agency review, the effective date 
of the previously issued order shall be suspended until ten days after the 
order on review has been mailed to all parties. 
C. ORAL ARGUMENT. 
A request for agency review and the response thereto shall set forth 
whether oral argument is sought as to said review. Upon request of any 
party, the agency head may set a time to conduct oral argument. 
D. ORDER ON REVIEW. 
A written order on review shall issue within 20 days after the filing of 
any response or, if applicable, the submission of the matter after oral 
argument. The order on review shall provide notice to any aggrieved parties 
of any right to further administrative reconsideration or judicial review. 
EXHIBIT "E" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL fclSTfiiCT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.. a 
Utah corporation and MARLEN V. 
JOHNSON, 
Petitioners, 
JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director, 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce, State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER, 
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY. 
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH 
CANNON, members of the Securities 
Advisory Board overseeing the 
Securities Division, 
Respondents 
EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
CASE NO. S^Ofc^OI* ( V 
JUDGE MMES s. mm 
The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter seeking issuance of a 
writ from this Court to be directed to Respondents to either grant Petitioners' Request for 
Agency Review (and thereby review the same) or to otherwise certify the subject order on 
review as a "final agency action" having come before this Court; the Court having reviewed 
the Petition and having determined that a hearing is not necessary, and good cause further 
appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows: 
1. The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter is hereby granted. 
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2. The Respondents are hereby immediately directed to undertake one of the 
following courses of action: 
(1) Either grant Petitioners' Request for Agency Review as contemplated in 
the Exhibits attached to the Petition and thereupon resolve all issues 
presented therein. 0£ 
(2) Certify the Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29. 1989. as a 
"final agency action" as contemplated in §63-46b-14. Utah Code Ann. 
DATED this^/day of October. 1989. 
BY THSydoURT 
ORDER.1 
TniW District Court Judge 
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EXHIBIT "F 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.. a 
Utah corporation and MARLEN V. 
JOHNSON. 
Petitioners. 
v. 
JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director. 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce. State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER. 
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY. 
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH 
CANNON, members of the Securities 
Advisory Board overseeing the 
Securities Division, 
Respondents 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 27th day of October, 1989, (s)he 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR EX PARTE EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT and EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
by certified mail, postage prepaid to JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director of Securities Division, 
located at 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; and to M. 
TRUMAN BOWLER, Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 124 South 200 East. St. 
George, Utah 84770. The undersigned also certifies that the same documents were 
r<LE* 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CASE NO. 890906506CV 
- 1 -
00033 
hand-delivered to Securities Advisory Board Members. KENT BURGON. located at 60 East 
South Temple. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111; DAVID E. HARDY, located at 215 South State 
Street. Suite 900. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2309; MARGARET WICKENS. located at 376 
East 400 South. Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and KEITH CANNON, located at 115 
South Main Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111. 
SRVC.l / I 
- 2 - C0094 
EXHIBIT "G 
FfiES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
vrm 0 1 w*9 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312 
Utah Attorney General 
MARK J. GRIFFIN, #4329 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
<£*<*** 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah Corporation and MARLEN V. 
JOHNSON, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director, 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce, State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER, 
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY, 
MARGARET WICKENS, AND KEITH 
CANNON, members of the 
Securities Advisory Board 
overseeing the Securities 
Division, 
Respondents. 
EX PARTE ORDER SETTING 
ASIDE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
Case No. 890906506 CV 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The Court having reviewed the Ex Parte Petition to Set Aside 
Ex Parte Order issued by this Court on October 27, 1989, and the 
Court being satisfied in having heard the Respondent's arguments 
in support of the Petition and being satisfied that there is just 
cause appearing therefore, hereby 
ooion 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that this Court's Ex Parte 
Order dated October 27, 1989, requiring the Respondents to 
perform certain acts, is hereby set aside. 
DATED this / - day of ~~)^^70^p(Jx/t>, 1989. 
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EXHIBIT "H 
^CXhihtT f\ 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
CRD No. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 259888 
ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW 
Case No. SD-89-46B 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
On September 11, 1989, Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson, pursuant to §63-46b-12 Utah Code 
Ann. and R151-46-b-12A of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative 
Proceedings before the Department of Business Regulation, requested 
agency review of an August 29, 1989 Order, and asked for an oral 
hearing thereon. The August 29, 1989 Order denied Respondents 
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition of the Division of 
Securities (the Division). 
Respondents have also requested certification of the August 
29, 1989 Order as a "final agency action," or, in the alternative, 
asked for an order declaring that Respondents had exhausted their 
administrative remedies regarding the issue of subject matter 
,* < * 00i^ 
jurisdiction. 
Respondents also requested that any order issued on review 
also be certified as a "final agency" action. 
Finally, Respondents requested that the Division disclose 
whether the Securities Advisory Board constitutes the Appellate 
Body performing this review, in order to determine the existence 
of any conflicts of interest by David Eccles Hardy, a member of 
that Board. 
On September 11, 1989, Respondents filed a brief in support 
of their request for agency review and oral hearing thereon. On 
September 26, 1989, the Securities Division filed a brief in reply 
to Respondents1 request for agency review and hearing. On October 
6, 1989 Respondents filed a reply brief in support of their request 
for agency review. 
THE DIRECTOR, AS PRESIDING OFFICER, now enters the following: 
Section 63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. sets forth the procedure 
which governs administrative review of agency orders. That statute 
vests agencies with the discretion to provide, by rule, whether 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek "review of an order 
by the agency or by a superior agency". R151-46b-12A of the Rules 
of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of 
Business Regulation allows such requests to be made as follows: 
A request for agency review may be filed...after the issuance 
of findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order entered 
in a formal adjudicative proceeding... . 
CO 
Section 63-46b-13 provides that if agency review of "an order" is 
not available pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 "and if the order would 
otherwise constitute final agency action", a party may request 
agency reconsideration of "the order". Section 63-46b-14 also 
provides that an aggrieved party "may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action...". 
Section 63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12 do not expressly limit 
agency review to orders which constitute final agency action. 
Thus, a party aggrieved by orders of an interim nature (i.e., an 
order denying a request for a continuance or an order denying a 
motion to dismiss) could arguably request agency review of such 
matters. However, in Sloan v. Board of Review, 118 Utah Adv. Rep 
68 (October 2, 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals distinguishes 
orders, which are not reviewable because they are not "final", from 
orders which do constitute "final agency action", by stating that 
"an order of the agency is not final so long as it reserves 
something to the agency for further decision". Id. at 68. In the 
Sloan case, the Court dismissed an appeal due to the lack of a 
final agency order. 
Given the nature of the August 29, 1989 Order, Respondents1 
request represents an interlocutory appeal and, following Sloan, 
would not be considered a final agency action. Review of 
interlocutory matters would necessarily deprive agency adjudicative 
proceedings of the simplicity and speed contemplated by the 
Administrative Procedures Act and the rules governing adjudicative 
proceedings in this Department, and would inappropriately interpose 
an interlocutory appeal process within the Department. 
COi'6 
In essence, absent a rule permitting agency review pursuant 
to Section 63-46b-12, agency reconsideration pursuant to Section 
63-46b-13 is only available as to an order which constitutes final 
agency action. The availability of judicial review is also limited 
to such orders. In light of the provisions which govern agency 
reconsideration and judicial review, and mindful of the rationale 
expressed in Sloan v. Board of Review, it is ill-advised to conduct 
agency review of orders which do not constitute final agency 
action. Although Section 63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12 do not so limit 
the availability of agency review, the efficient administration of 
agency adjudicative proceedings compels the conclusion that such 
interpretation be given. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Respondents' Request for Agency Review and oral argument 
thereon are denied. 
2. Respondents' Requests that both the August 29, 1989 order 
and this Order on Review, be certified as "final agency action", 
are denied because it is not considered to be within the province 
of the Presiding Officer to so certify or declare. 
3. Respondents' concerns regarding the involvement of 
Securities Advisory Board member David Eccles Hardy in the 
consideration of these requests are inapplicable, since the 
Director has acted as the Presiding Officer, and accordingly, 
Respondents' request for an order to disclose any conflicts of 
interest is also denied. 
ooi 
Dated this 3# day of October, 1989 
rohn C. Baldwin 
Director, Division of Securities 
Presiding Officer 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing 
Order on Agency Review properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John 
Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th 
Floor, Kennecott Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to Mark J. 
Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the Division of Securities 
at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114. 
Dated this v5$ day of October, 1989. 
Te/ri Farn^orth 
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DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
JOHN C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR 
P.O. BOX 45802 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 530-6600 
BEFORE THE UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Registration 
of Johnson-Bowles, Inc. to Act as 
Securities Broker-Dealer 
CRD NO. 07578 
MOTION TO 
CONVERT TO FORMAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDING 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
The Division of Securities of the Department of Commerce of 
the State of Utah, by and through its Director, John C. Baldwin, 
hereby moves to convert administrative adjudicative proceedings 
from informal to formal in the above entitled matter. The basis 
for this Motion is that it will serve the public interest because 
it will prevent the duplication of this hearing process should the 
outcome be challenged in the future and neither party is prejudiced 
because no hearing date has been set and only the formality of the 
hearing not the presentation of the evidence is effected. 
DATED this 
present 
ML day of £ 1989. 
C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
EXHIBIT "J 
BCHiBTT ?ff i f 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OBTHE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
: BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN 
: SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
: AGENCY REVIEW AND HEARING 
: THEREON 
: Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Respondents Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson, by and 
through their counsel, hereby submit this Brief in Support of their Requests for Agency 
Review and a Hearing Thereon as provided in Department of Commerce Rule 
R151-46b-12(A). Respondents incorporate by reference their pleadings on file herein 
relative to their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss and respectfully request that the appellate 
body further review all such pleadings. The purpose of Respondents' Request is to seek 
reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's Order or Ruling of August 29,1989, as it is 
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impossible that the Division could have subject-matter jurisdiction over these proceedings 
and to proceed when the Division lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is a waste of time. 
money and energy on the part of all parties, aside from being unlawful. Respondents thus 
have the right to exhaust all administrative remedies in regard to this jurisdictional issue. 
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C. Because the August 29.1989 Order "conflicts" 
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therefore, the Order of August 29 is erroneous 
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before it. namely whether the Division has the 
kind of subject matter jurisdiction which Congress 
has exclusively delegated to federal courts, and 
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E. The Order appealed from contains irrelevant and 
erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and otherwise tends to address the merits of 
the Division's case, and therefore it should be 
vacated. 26 
F. The August 29. Order erroneously concludes that 
the Division has power and authority to give 
extra-territorial effect to its March 1. Order. 
an interpretation which is not in the Order itself 
and which further violates the Division's enabling 
act, the Exchange Act. and the Supremacy and 
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. 29 
CONCLUSION 33 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Respondents are in the securities brokerage business. They are therefore 
registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.. f NASD"), a self-
regulatory organization f SRO") and national securities association. The NASD, by 
Congressional mandate, is exclusively governed by the Securities Exchange Commission 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §78o-3. In 1983, Congress amended 
§15(b)(8M9) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and completely did away with SECO, an 
alternative SRO to the NASD. Because of the 1983 amendment and because Respondents 
are not members of any national securities exchange, they must, as a matter of law, be 
members of the NASD. (See §15 and S15A of the Exchange Act and H.R. Rep. No. 98-106. 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).) As members of the NASD, Respondents are required by law 
to obey its rules and regulations, including its Rules of Fair Practice. 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(7). 
(This also means that the Division's argument at the hearing on Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss that the NASD is a "club" of all things, an agrument apparently believed by the 
Administrative Law Judge, is an abject misstatement of the law.) 
- 3 - 00028 
2. It is undisputed that Interpretation and enforcement of duties, liabilities. 
and obligations under NASD and SEC rules and regulations are preempted under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.1 (See 
§15. S15A. §27 and §28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.) It is further significant 
that the express purpose of the Exchange Act is to regulate the -trading'' of securities in 
interstate commerce — the only issue subject to Respondents' Request for Agency Review. 
3. Prior to March 1.1989. Respondent Johnson-Bowles sold several thousand 
shares of the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation to several out-of-state NASD 
member broker-dealers and one clearing corporation. At the time of such sales, 
Johnson-Bowles did not physically possess such securities. This is known in the industry as 
"selling short" and is not only not unlawf ul or improper, but it is a common, every day 
occurrance in the industry. (See Respondents' Memorandum in Support of its Motion to 
Dismiss on file herein. %2 thereof.) It is also undisputed that these sales by Johnson-Bowles 
to out-of-state NASD members and a registered clearing corporation are and were 
governed by the NASD. Further, none of the entities to whom Johnson-Bowles sold such 
stock prior to March 1. do business In the state of Utah and they are therefore not subject 
to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Utah Securities Division. 
4. On March 1.1989. the Division, based solely on the outcome of a lawsuit 
Johnson-Bowles had previously filed in federal court, issued an Order suspending all state 
exemptions for the offer and sale of securities of U.S.A. Medical In the state of Utah. A true 
and correct copy of such Order Is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
1
 For an Informative discussion of the NASD and how 1t 1s regulated by the SEC and 
must, as a matter of law, comply with all the provisions of the Exchange Act. Its own rules, and 
tfie~ru1es of both the SEC and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), reference Is made 
to Austin Municipal Securities, Inc. v. NASD. 757 F.2d 676, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 192.027 (5th Clr. 
Ct.~5T App. 1985T) 
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5. It is undisputed that the Division's Order of March 1 makes no mention of 
"purchases" nor does it. by its own terms, prohibit purchases by an NASD member to 
consummate outstanding NASD contracts entered into prior to the date of such Order. 
6. It is also undisputed that an SEC Release, a true and correct copy of which 
Is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". specifically permits a broker-dealer to consummate 
outstanding securities contracts during even a federal, SEC trading suspension order. As 
NASD members. Respondents have a right to rely on such Exchange Act Release. 
7. It is further undisputed that an exemption for the "purchase" of a security is 
not required under any state or federal law and that therefore, the Division's Order did not 
and could not prohibit "purchases" by Respondents for any purpose, let alone the express 
purpose of fulfilling their Exchange Act obligations. 
8. Article III, §1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice requires a broker-dealer to 
honor its securities transactions or it may be subject to severe penalties, including 
substantial fines, suspension, and even expulsion from the NASD. (See NASD Manual (CCH) 
12151 at p.2013-3 (May. 1989). In Respondents' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of 
their Motion to Dismiss on file herein. Respondents have cited authority in which NASD 
members have been severely fined, suspended, or expelled for failure to honor their 
Exchange Act trades. 
9. Article III of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice further requires a 
broker-dealer to deliver securities to its buying broker-dealer within a fixed number of days 
of the date of the sale. (See, e.g.. NASD Manual (CCH). 52181 at p. 2123-3 (May. 1988) and 
Appendix B thereto.) 
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10. Based on Respondents' obligations as NASD members to honor their 
pre-March 1 securities transactions with out-of-state entities and based on the fact that 
the Division's Order neither prohibited "purchases'* nor purchases to fulfill outstanding 
Exchange Act obligations. Respondents "purchased" a sufficient number of U.S.A. Medical 
securities from certain Utah residents for this exclusive and avowed purpose of delivery. It 
is further undisputed that Respondents did not "solicit" the sale of U.S.A. Medical stock 
from Utah residents to themselves after March 1 as set forth in copies of letters from such 
individuals on file herein. Further, as a matter of law, a broker-dealer cannot "solicit" a 
"sale" but only a "purchase." (See e.g.. Rule 144(g)(2) of the General Rules and Regulations of 
the Commission. Reg. §230.144. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) *2705A at p. 2788; Upton. 
Broker-Dealer Regulation. Clark Boardman Securities Law Series. Vol. 15, §3.03[3][d][i]( p. 
3-95. ("... the prohibition on solicitation of customers applies only to the solicitation of 
buy orders, rather than the solicitation of sell orders."). It is noteworthy that on the basis of 
the foregoing realization on the part of the Division, namely that its March 1. Order did not 
prohibit "purchases", the Division, in July, amended its Petitions and dropped the specific 
allegation that Respondents in fact violated its Order of March 1. 
11. The U.S.A. Medical securities so purchased after March 1 were delivered 
by Respondents to the various out-of-state entities to whom Respondents owed such 
securities and such securities were "accepted" by them in accordance with NASD and SEC 
rules, including Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code governing Investment Securities. 
It is further undisputed that such entities were aware of the Division's March 1. Order and 
U.S. District Judge Greene's ruling discussed below and yet they each and all accepted 
"delivery" by Respondents after March 1. regardless. [Emphasis added.] 
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12. It is undisputed that "delivery" of such securities to out-of-state entities in 
satisfaction of Respondents' outstanding NASD and SEC obligations did not effect a 
"distribution" of U.S.A. Medical securities to Utahns or anyone else (as the securities had 
already been "sold" out-of-state prior to March 1. and delivery was but a ministerial act 
undertaken to "even out" Respondent Johnson-Bowies' "open" accounts with such entities.) 
13. Based on the Division's unilateral interpretation of its own March 1. Order 
that such Order prohibited "purchases" from Utah residents for the sole purpose of 
completing Respondents' out-of-state, federal obligations, the Division, on April 27. 
brought the instant administrative proceedings against Respondents. Such Petitions were 
amended by the Division in July and generally allege that Respondents' "purchase" of U.S.A. 
Medical securities from Utah residents after March 1. is a "dishonest or unethical practice" 
under §61-1-6(1) and (2). Utah Code Ann. — a "practice" which allegedly justifies revocation 
of Respondents' registrations with the Division as broker-dealers and agents. Saying it 
another way. Respondents' noble and legitimate efforts to honor and fulfill their federal 
NASD and SEC obligations after March 1. which neither damaged nor had any effect on Utah 
residents or the purpose behind the Division's Order (designed only to protect Utah 
residents), apparently justifies, in the Division's view, putting Respondents completely out of 
business through the instant proceedings. 
14. After the Division's Order of March 1. Respondent Marlen V. Johnson had 
numerous conversations with the NASD in Denver and was informed by Kenneth Schaeffer. 
Assistant Director, that Respondents' failure to honor their outstanding NASD contracts by 
delivering U.S.A. Medical stock would be violative of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and 
could subject Respondents to serious disciplinary action by the NASD. (See Exhibit "C" 
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attached hereto and incorporated by reference, an affidavit to this effect which is part of 
the record in these proceedings.) 
15. It is noteworthy that on February 16,1989, prior to the Division's March 1, 
Order, Respondent Johnson-Bowles brought a 10b-5 securities fraud action in federal 
court against U.S.A. Medical and its "control persons'1 for market manipulation and the 
orchestration of a so-called "short squeeze" which had caused Johnson-Bowies' extensive 
"short position" in the securities of U.SA Medical. Such case was assigned to U.S. District 
Court Judge J. Thomas Greene and is denominated by Case No. C-89-157-G. In such 
Complaint, Johnson-Bowles, as Plaintiff, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to the 
effect that the court declare Respondents' outstanding contracts in the securities of U.S.A. 
Medical "void" or "voidable" because t>f the illegal conduct of the U.S A Medical 
Co-Conspirators. After a two-day preliminary injunction hearing on February 27 and 28. 
Judge Greene, while ruling that the securities of U.S A Medical had been the subject of 
securities fraud and market manipulation, did not grant Johnson-Bowles' a preliminary 
injunction and in effect ruled that Respondents had no choice whatsoever but to honor their 
federal NASD and SEC obligations. 
16. Based on a U.S. District Judge's ruling — a ruling which has the obvious 
force and effect of federal law — and Respondents' unequivocal Exchange Act obligations, 
Respondents purchased U.S A Medical securities as aforesaid for the sole purpose of 
completing their outstanding, out-of-state contracts. For this reason and others set forth 
hereinbelow, the Division's Amended Petitions, based on their capricious and bizarre 
interpretation of their own March 1. Order are not only in conflict with NASD and SEC rules 
and regulations, but they are in further conflict with Judge Greene's ruling that such 
00033 
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contracts were neither "void" nor "voidable". It Is also significant that based on the 
testimony adduced at the preliminary injunction hearing before Judge Greene, virtually all of 
the stock of U.SA Medical was and had been "boxed" in the state of Utah and therefore, it 
would have been impossible for Respondents to have purchased U.S.A. Medical stock 
outside of the state of Utah to fulfill their outstanding federal obligations. Further, such 
would have required Respondents to "solicit" out-of-state residents to sell stock to 
Respondents as Utah residents in arguable violation of the Division's March 1. Order — an 
argument ironically presented by the Division at the hearing on Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
17. On July 3.1989. Respondents moved the Division, in these proceedings, for 
an Order under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the Division lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant proceedings. Respondents argued orally and in 
such Motion and Supporting and Reply Memoranda that the Division's Petitions and 
Amended Petitions were in direct conflict with NASD and SEC requirements over which 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. Based on this diametric 
conflict. Respondents argued that the Division had no power or authority under its own 
"enabling statute" or otherwise to discipline an NASD member for obeying, complying, or 
attempting to comply with such exclusive federal obligations under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. It is particularly noteworthy that §28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
specifically prohibits a state from regulating in a manner that "conflicts" with the Exchange 
Act. (See discussion hereinbelow.) 
18. Respondents' July 3. Motion was denied by the Administrative Law Judge 
by Order of August 29. 1989, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
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"D". It is this Order which is the subject of the present Request for Agency Review on the 
various assignments of error stated therein. 
19. Lastly. Respondents have been required to vigorously resist the Division's 
Amended Petitions in that the Division has extortivefy and unreasonably demanded 
settlement from Respondents as follows: 
a. A one month suspension for Respondent Marlen V. Johnson; 
b. An additional six month probationary period for Respondent Marlen V. 
Johnson; 
c. A six month probationary period for Respondent Johnson-Bowles; and 
d. A $25,000 fine from each Respondent or a total of $50,000. 
The foregoing settlement demand has ironically been proffered by the Division even though, 
as a matter of law. it has no power or authority whatsoever to extract or demand "fines" 
from Respondents. (See §61-1-etseq.) The foregoing is further not to lose sight of the 
fact that Johnson-Bowles would be hard-pressed to operate for a month during a 
suspension of its registered principal Marlen V. Johnson and therefore, the Division's 
unlawful revocation actions and settlement demands are extortive and maliciously designed 
to put Respondents out-of-business and for no other reason or purpose. In addition, the 
foregoing settlement offer has been further extended by the Division when it cannot point 
to one single, solitary Utah resident who has been damaged in any way by the conduct of 
Respondents and when Respondents single-handedly took it upon themselves to uncover 
the entire U.SA Medical fraud in federal court — something that the Division itself was 
unable and unwilling to do in February 1989. To be sure, had it not been for Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles' uncovering of the U.S A Medical fraud in Judge Qreene's court, the 
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Division would never have entered or been able to enter its Order of March 1 to protect 
Utah residents from subsequent unlawful distributions. 
ISSUE ON AGENCY REVIEW 
Whether the Division's ruling on August 29.1989. is erroneous in concluding 
that the Division has power and authority to regulate and discipline Respondents (federal 
licensees and NASD members) in a manner that diametrically "conflicts* and is inconsistent 
with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. 
(Respondents incorporate herein by reference their items of assignment of 
error as set forth in their formal Request for Agency Review on file herein. Respondents, in 
the interests of non-duplication, further incorporate by reference their other pleadings on 
file herein that were before the Administrative Law Judge.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S RULING 
ON RESPONDENTS' RULE 12(b)(1) MOTION 
TO DISMISS DATED AUGUST 29.1989 IS ERRONEOUS 
AS A SIMPLE MATTER OF LAW AND MUST BE REVERSED 
A. Under the ''Non-Delegation Doctrine" in Administrative Law, the August 29 
Order or Ruling is erroneous and must be reversed. 
The Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29. is violative of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This is because Congress has specifically delegated the 
power and authority to regulate interstate trading of securities to the SEC and the NASD 
thereunder. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.15 U.S.CA 977aa. provides 
that any suit "to enforce any liability or duty created by this Chapter [the '34 Act]* must be 
brought in a U.S. District Court. The present tribunal is certainly not a district court of the 
- 1 1 -
000 
United States. Section 27 broadly encompasses all suits to enforce or interpret "any... 
duty created by" the Act. [Emphasis added.] Leroy. Attorney General of the State of Idaho 
v. Great Western United Corp., U.S. Sup. Ct. (CCH) [78 -'81 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. 
Rptr. (CCH) 171.488 at p.68.611 (Justice White). In this regard, what "duty" could be more 
applicable to the Exchange Act than the very Exchange Act duty and obligation to complete 
brokerage transactions under Act III, Sec. I of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice? Because the 
dispute in this case goes to the very existence and purpose of SEC and NASD rules, the 
Division's efforts to punish and prohibit compliance with SEC and NASD rules and 
regulations is a usurpation of power and authority not delegated to it. 
Section 28(a) of the Act provides in part that: 
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities 
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) 
of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does 
not conflict with the provisions of this title or the rules and 
regulations thereunder. [Emphasis added.] 
15 U.S.C.A. §78bb(a). Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act thus imposes an "affirmative duty" 
on states, not to regulate inconsistently with federal mandate, the violation of which must 
be redressed in the federal courts under §27. Leroy, supra at p.68,607. In short, the 
purpose of §28(a) was to leave the states with as much leeway to regulate securities 
transactions as the Supremacy Clause would allow them (in the absence of such a 
provision). Leroy, supra at p. 68.608. note 13. In this case, the several states have not been 
delegated authority to regulate or enforce state administrative orders contrary to Article III, 
§1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice or any other SEC or NASD rule or regulation. 
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That the NASD and SEC and their concomitant rules and regulations are 
embraced by the Act is specifically set forth in §15 and 15A of the Act. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has recently confirmed the exclusiveness of interpreting NASD and SEC rules and 
regulations in the case of Western Capital & Securities, Inc. v. Knudsving, (Ut. Ct. of App.. 
Case No. 880198-CA, Feb. 7.1989) [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH). 
594.337. This and other authorities, including the specific provisions of the Exchange Act 
as cited by Respondents in their Supporting Memoranda below, have been totally and 
inexcusably ignored by the Administrative Law Judge in making his August 29. ruling. 
The Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the federal Constitution, and most, 
if not all state Constitutions, impose limits upon the legislature's actions. (See People v. 
Green. 1 U. 11 (holding that the Utah legislature may not. under Article VI, Sec. 1. of Utah's 
constitution, encroach upon the provisions of the federal Constitution and further holding 
that the legislature has no power to increase or diminish powers of any federal court in this 
state).) Nonetheless, the Division has brazenly taken upon itself the unlawful task of 
regulating and disciplining Respondents for totally obeying their Exchange Act obligations 
as specifically required of them thereunder. 
The non-delegation doctrine in administrative law provides that a legislature 
may not delegate full legislative powers to an agency that is repugnant to the Constitution. 
The source of the doctrine is in the Constitution itself. Article 1, Section 1 provides that "all 
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in the Congress of the United States 
". Based on the non-delegation principle, state legislatures cannot confer duties and 
authorities on administrative agencies that are repugnant to the federal Constitution or 
federal enactments. To be sure, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Art. IV. cl. 2. 
C0038 
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provides that if a state law conflicts with federal law, federal law necessarily prevails. 
Based on this delegation of power, the existence of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
creates the right not to be subject to conflicting state regulation. [Emphasis 
added.] Leroy. supra at p. 68.611. Viewed from the perspective of state officials, the 
existence of the Exchange Act creates a duty in such individuals not to undertake 
conflicting regulation efforts. Nevertheless, the instant proceedings could not be more 
diametrically conflicting with SEC and NASD rules mandating a broker-dealer and NASD 
member to honor its trades. To be sure, it is impossible that Respondents could have 
complied with their NASD and SEC obligations and the Division's unilateral interpretation of 
its own order at the same time. [Emphasis added.] 
Because the power to regulate trading of securities in interstate commerce 
has been expressly delegated by Congress to the federal courts and the SEC and the NASD 
under the Exchange Act. it is inconceivable if not ludicrous that the exact same power could 
be simultaneously delegated to the Utah legislature to in turn second-handedly delegate to 
a state administrative agency such as the Division. 
The important component of non-delegation is the issue of to whom the 
decision-making power is given. This aspect of non-delegation recently figured in a very 
important decision. Bowsher v. Synar. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). overturning a balanced 
budget statute known as the Graham-Rudman-Hollings Act. In Bowsher. the U.S. Supreme 
Court flatly said: 
To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute laws 
would be. in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress 
could simply remove or threaten to remove, an officer for 
executing the laws in a fashion found unsatisfactory to 
Congress. This kind of congressional control over the execution 
of the laws . . . is unconstitutionally impermissible. 
- 1 4 -
coo 
By the same token. Congress has not delegated Exchange Act authority to the Utah 
legislature to in turn delegate the same authority to the Utah Securities Division to, in its 
turn, inconsistently regulate and enforce that which specifically and exclusively comes under 
the Exchange Act. Because the decision-making power to regulate trading in the 
over-the-counter securities markets in interstate commerce has been expressly delegated 
to the SEC and NASD under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. the Division has no 
jurisdiction to regulate Respondents, inconsistently or at all. in this regard. Unfortunately. 
this is what the Division is doing and what the August 29. Order says it can do. Moreover. 
the preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is: 
An Act to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and 
of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign 
commerce and throughlhe mails, to prevent inequitable and 
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other 
purposes. 
Based on the foregoing, it is impossible as a matter of law that the Division has jurisdiction 
to bring proceedings repugnant to federal law and therefore, the Administrative Law 
Judge's Order of August 29. is erroneous and must be reversed forthwith. 
B. Based on the Division's own "enabling statute", the Division lacks power and 
authority to regulate in a manner that conflicts with and supersedes the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. and therefore, the Order of August 29. which erroneously concludes 
the contrary, must be reversed. 
z
 For a detail of the Suprene Court's discussion of non-delegatlon, see Panama 
Refining Co. y. Ryan. 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Co. v. Un1ted"5taTesT?95 U.S. 
495 (19J5). In these cases, the Supreme Court used the non-delegation doctrine to strike down 
two separate portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). This case, 
however, 1s a wore conspicuous violation of non-delegation 1n that Congress has never delegated 
authority to the Division, through the Utah legislature, to regulate, or even regulate 
Inconsistently, that which I t has specifically delegated to the SEC and the NASO under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §78. 
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Delegation, as discussed above, should not be confused with the ultra vires 
doctrine. This doctrine asks whether an agency is functioning within its statutory powers. 
[Emphasis added.] The easy way to distinguish these two issues is to keep in mind that the 
non-delegation principle involves a look the face of the agency's enabling act and does not 
normally inquire into subsequent actions taken by the agency's administrator. Ultra vires, 
by contrast, presumes that the agency's enabling act contains a proper standard (i.e.. that 
it is constitutional on its face), and then investigates subsequent agency action to see if 
that action is authorized by the enabling act. 
The Division's enabling statute relative to these proceedings is contained in 
§61-1-6(1). Utah Code Ann. Quite clearly, this enabling statute or clause does not give the 
Division power or authority to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer or agent for 
complying or attempting to comply with superseding SEC and/or NASD rules. It does not 
say that the Division can override or supersede the SEC and NASD rules in acting to suspend 
or revoke the registration of a Utah broker-dealer and NASD member. It does not say that 
compliance with SEC and NASD rules and regulations under the Exchange Act creates a 
basis on which a broker-dealer or agent can be simultaneously subject to a state revocation 
proceeding. The statute states but nine (9) grounds on which the Division may act to revoke 
a broker-dealer or agent's license, none of which are remotely applicable to the interstate 
conduct of Respondents. To be sure, the statute clearly does not say that unambiguous 
SEC and NASD rules, designed to facilitate trading of securities in interstate commerce, can 
be capriciously deemed by the Division as "dishonest or unethical practices". On the 
contrary, had Respondents deemed the Division's March 1. Order as superseding federal law 
and preventing consummation of their out-of-state trades, and. as a result thereof, had 
Q004?w 
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Respondents ignored express Exchange Act obligations. Respondents would have been 
accused by the NASD and SEC of engaging in "dishonest or unethical practices." See 15 
U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(7). 
This point is buttressed by §61-1-24, Utah Code Ann., which requires the 
Division, with respect to rules, forms, and orders to cooperate with the Securities Exchange 
Commission with the view to achieving maximum uniformity. [Emphasis added.] Further, 
§61-1-27. Utah Code Ann., directly conflicts with the position of the Division in regard to 
these proceedings. Section 61-1-27 provides: 
This Chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose as to make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this 
Chapter with the related federal regulation. [Emphasis added.] 
Contrary to §61-1-27, the Division's existing actions are repugnant to any "coordinating" of 
its interpretation and administration of §61-1-6 "with the related federal regulation". Quite 
literally, it is impossible to imagine a set of circumstances under which conduct by a state 
would not be more conflicting with a federal regulatory scheme. 
If an agency is acting outside its jurisdictional limits, it is said to be functioning 
in a ultra vires manner. The authority of courts to review jurisdictional questions of this 
kind relative to agencies like the Division was firmly established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Crowell v. Benson, 286 U.S. 22 (1932). The term ultra vires is borrowed from corporate law 
and must be sharply distinguished from the delegation doctrine. A delegation analysis looks 
at the face of the enabling act and asks whether the statute itself contains a proper 
standard curbing unfettered agency discretion. By constrast, the ultra vires doctrine 
assumes there is a proper delegation in the statute, and then analyzes a specific action 
taken by the agency to determine whether that action is within the limits set by its enabling 
0004 
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&ct. In this instance, the Division's petitions must be overturned and dismissed because 
such petitions are clearly outside the agency's boundaries. Board of Governors. Federal 
Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986). As the Supreme Court 
in Board of Governors, put it: "If the statute is clear and unambiguous (with regard to an 
agency's authority), that is the end of the matter " In this case, there is no ambiguity in 
statutory interpretation. Even a cursory review of the express language of §61-1-6(1). Utah 
Code Ann., evidences that the Division cannot take action to discipline a broker-dealer or 
agent for obeying Exchange Act mandates. This would turn the Supremacy and Commerce 
Clauses on their heads which is exactly what the August 29. Order does. For this reason, 
the Administrative Law Judge's August 29.1989 decision could not be more erroneous, 
even under the ultra vires doctrine. Going further, however, it could not be more self-
evident that neither Congress nor Utah's legislature have delegated authority to the Division 
to unilaterally interpret its own orders inconsistently with or in a manner that overrides 
Exchange Act rules and obligations.3 Thus one can see the compounded error of the 
August 29. Order. 
It Is also undisputed that the Division is an agent of the Utah courts and even a 
Utah District Court has no jurisdiction to address the Exchange Act issues presented in this 
dase. See Western Capital, supra, a recent Utah Court of Appeals decision embracing this 
point precisely. For this reason alone, the Order of August 29 is erroneous as the Division 
J
 I t 1s readily arguable that the Division acted Improperly by proceeding against 
Respondents with adjudication when 1t should have proceeded by rulemaking, thereby giving 
Respondents and those similarly situated actual notice of how i t would suddenly Interpret Its 
March 1, Order. However, this due process argument goes to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 1s not 
germane to the Jurisdictional Issue on review. The Order of August 29, erroneously assumes that 
the Division's March 1, Order somehow proscribed "purchases" by NASD members to complete 
outstanding contracts and that such constitutes a violation of §61-1-6(1)(g). Utah Code Ann. 
Such a conclusion 1s not only repugnant to the Division's own enabling statute, but i t 1s~Turther 
constitutionally repugnant to the Division's own power and authority to self-servlngly Interpret 
Its own orders. 
C O O ^ 
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has no such authority as an agent of Utah Courts. See, e.g.. State v. Mechem. 316 P.2d 
1069 (N. Mex. S. Ct. 1957) (holding that workers* compensation actions may only be tried in 
a court, not by an agency, because those actions are exclusive within the court's judicial 
power). Similarly, it is quite impossible that the Division could conceivably try issues as to 
Exchange Act obligations when a Utah state court itself has no such authority, power, or 
jurisdiction. 
C. Because the August 29,1989 Order "conflicts" with the rules and 
regulations promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act, including §28(a) thereof, it is 
preempted by federal law and therefore, the Order of August 29 is erroneous as a matter of 
law and must be reversed. 
The Pre-emption Doctrme is an additional basis on which the Order of August 
29 should be reversed and the instant administrative proceedings dismissed. When 
Congress exercises a granted power, concurrent conflicting state legislation may be 
challenged via the Preemption Doctrine. The Supremacy Clause. Art. IV. cl. II. mandates that 
federal law overrides, i.e.. preempts any state regulation where there is an actual conflict 
between the two sets of legislation such that both cannot stand, for example, if federal law 
forbids an act which state legislation requires or. the contrary thereof, which exists in this 
case. In this case, federal law requires an act which not even state legislation, but mere 
state agency order allegedly forbids. Certainly, a more concrete and offensively 
conspicuous example of when and where the Preemption Doctrine applies could not exist. 
In a leading Supreme Court case on the Preemption Doctrine, the court stated 
that the test for preemption is whether under the circumstances of a particular case, the 
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
coo** 
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52. 67 (1941). The 
Constitutional principle is simply that states and federal government should have a common 
end in view, namely, to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies 
which might have some authority over the subject matter. Amalgamated Association of 
Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Where 
there is no indicia of Congressional intent (i.e., a "dormant" Commerce Clause issue), a 
court may have to balance the state and federal interest to achieve this end. Such is not 
the case here as it would be ignoring the entire Exchange Act to declare otherwise or 
engage in any balancing test. The August 29 Order fails to address or discuss 
Congressional intent in the area of interstate, over-the-counter trading of securities and 
had it done so, the Judge would necessarily have concluded that there is clear, concise, and 
unambiguous legislative intent within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Schneiderwind v. 
ANR Pipeline Company, 108 S.Ct. 1145. 485 U.S. 293 (March 22, 1988) (holding that a 
preemption question requires an examination of Congressional intent and striking down a 
State statute under the commerce clause for impinging on a federal regulatory scheme). 
Based merely on the preamble to the '34 Act quoted above, there can be no dispute over 
Congress' intent and no need for the Administrative Law Judge to balance state and federal 
interests in this case. Nonetheless, the Administrative Law Judge concluded, in spite of 
clear, unambiguous Congressional intent contained in the Exchange Act, that the Division 
has subject-matter jurisdiction to regulate and discipline in conflict therewith. 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have adopted a three prong inquiry to 
establish pre-emption. They are generally: 
(1) The prevasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme; 
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(2) The federal occupation of the field as necessitated by the 
need for national uniformity; 
(3) The danger of conflict between states laws and the 
administration of the federal program. 
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497. 502-505 (1956). The progeny of Hines and Nelson 
have continually narrowed the scope of judicial inquiry into a determination of whether. 
under the particular facts of the case, the existence of the state regulatory scheme is 
facilitative or detrimental to the purposes and objectives of the federal statute. In fact. 
most preemption cases discuss state legislation as possibly being in conflict or inconsistent 
with the federal scheme, not, as in this case, unilateral and reckless "state action" 180 
degrees in conflict with a federal regulatory scheme. For instance, the Division seeks to 
revoke Respondents' state registrations for allegedly engaging in "dishonest and unethical 
practices." At the same time, the NASD, statutorily and through the SEC, is mandated to 
secure compliance by its members with the federal securities laws as well as its own 
regulations, which are themselves designed to promote "ethical business behavior." 15 
U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(7). Respondents' conduct from a purely federal standpoint was indeed 
"ethical". How then, can the very same conduct be deemed "unethical" from a state 
Standpoint and yet there be no "conflict" between the regulatory schemes as the Division 
argues? There can thus be no question that the instant proceedings are diametrically 
opposed to the carrying-out of specific Congressional intent. If Congress intended states 
to encroach upon areas specifically delegated by it to the SEC and NASD, why have no 
states done such, either on their own or through their adoption of the Uniform Securities 
Act. To be sure, §1904, taken together with §514 of the Uniform Securities Act compels 
federal/state integration or harmonization and it should be noted that Utah has in fact 
enacted the Uniform Act. 
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Co-operation is also a two-way street. Thus, states may not. under the 
Supremacy Clause, refuse to enforce valid federal laws even though such enforcement is in 
state court. Testa v. Katt. 330 U.S. 368 (1947). Unfortunately, this is precisely what the 
Division has arrogantly done, as if both the '34 Act did not exist and it had no bearing on 
either the state of Utah or an administrative agency thereof. The only exception to the 
foregoing is if Congress expressly or impliedly excuses a state from enforcing such federal 
law. See ejj.. Douglas v. New York. N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377. 387-88 (1929). In this case, 
Congress has not excused the Division or the state of Utah from enforcing SEC and NASD 
mandates; Congress has never said a state can regulate in diametrical conflict with NASD 
and SEC rules and regulations and yet such is precisely what the Division is doing and what 
the Order of August 29. says the Divfson can do. In fact, one cannot imagine a greater, 
more poignant conflict between state and federal law: if Respondents comply with NASD 
and SEC rules they apparently engage in "dishonest or unethical practices" yet if they 
comply with the Division's unilateral interpretation of its own order, they violate SEC and 
NASD obligations, subjecting themselves to fine, suspension and expulsion from the 
brokerage business, let alone costly arbitration with every out-of-state entity to whom they 
owed stock. A more telling and flagrant example of a state agency's self-will run riot in 
violation of the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution could not exist. The 
August 29. Order is thus repugnant to the mandate of comity as further articulated in Art. 
IV, Sees. 1 and 2 of the federal Constitution. See e ^ , Toomer v. Witsell. 334 U.S. 385. 395 
i 
(1948), 
A discussion of preemption relative to the Exchange Act cannot be made 
without reference to the significant Supreme Court case of Edgar v. Mite, U.S. Sup. Ct. 
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[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 198,728 (June 23,1982). In Edgar, the 
Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether the Illinois Business Takeover 
Act was unconstitutional under the Williams Act. a 1968 amendment to the Exchange Act. 
After analyzing the protections afforded localities versus the burden imposed by the state 
statute on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that the Illinois statute was 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and therefore preempted under the Exchange 
Act. The Court held that the Commerce Clause precludes the application of a state law to 
commerce that takes place outside a state's borders regardless of whether or not such 
commerce has effects within the state. The state statute was thus declared 
unconstitutional in that it imposed a burden on interstate commerce which was excessive in 
light of the local interests the state statute was desiged to further. Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 US 137, 90 S.Ct. 844. The Division's present actions to put Respondents out of 
business serve no purpose for the benefit of Utah residents when compared to the burdens 
such actions impose on interstate commerce. In fact, the Division's Amended Petitions in 
no way serve to protect Utah residents at all. If anything. Respondents have to some extent 
ensured that thousands of shares of U.S.A. Medical are no longer subject to being sold to 
Utah residents as such shares have been "exported" out of Utah. Would the Division rather 
have all such stock still sitting here in Utah waiting to be re-distributed at some point to 
Utah residents In violation of the Division's March 1, Order? if one balances the interest of 
this locality in disciplining Respondents as against the burden imposed on several 
out-of-state broker-dealers and a major clearing corporation, one must conclude that the 
purely speculative nature of protection afforded by the Division's disciplinary actions 
impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce — a burden which far outweighs any 
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local putative benefits. Because the Division's actions seek to affect interstate commerce 
and prohibit the facilitation of interstate commercial transactions — transactions already 
undertaken and entered into by Respondents with out-of-state residents — such action by 
the Division can hardly be said to affect interstate commerce only incidentally. Edgar v. 
Mite, supra. Simply put. the Edgar court held that if a state law affects interstate securities 
transactions, it violates the Exchange Act. The Division's actions are also clearly atypical of 
everyday Blue Sky regulation in that the Division is seeking to directly regulate specific 
interstate securities transactions that have already taken place across state lines. In fact. 
Respondents' transactions, for which they are now defending revocation proceedings, are 
interstate commerce. [Emphasis added.] Edgar, supra. 
The Respondents are also being discriminated against as federal licensees and 
NASD members merely because they are Utah residents. This kind of discrimination 
characteristically invalidates a state law under the Commerce Clause because such state 
action is based on impermissible protectionist intent or effect. L.P. Acqusition Co. v. Tyson. 
['85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 192.271 (6th Cir. Ct. of App. 1985). 
In sum. the Supreme Court has made no suggestion that S28(a). the savings 
provision in the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §78bb(a)(1982)]. authorizes, in any way. state 
violations of the Commerce Clause. Edgar, supra. In Public Utilities Commission v. United 
Fuel Gas Co.. 317 U.S. 456,63 S.Ct 369. 87 L. Ed. 396 (1943). the Supreme Court upheld an 
injunction against a state on the ground that a supplier suffered injury from enforcement of 
a state's order for proof itself and that existence of complying with such orders was among 
the contingencies against which Congress sought to guard against in creating exclusive 
federal Jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.] 
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The Division's only argument is that the instant proceedings come within its 
legitimate police power. However, it is well settled in Utah that the mere declaration by the 
legislature that an act is within the exercise of its police power is not binding on courts 
unless the act Is specifically within the scope of such power. Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v. 
Stewart. 82 U. 198. 23 P.2d 229. In addition. Art. I. Sec. 18 of the Utah Constitution 
prevents a state from "impairing the obligation of contracts'*. While the Division argues in 
this case that impairing Respondents' outstanding interstate brokerage contracts is within 
its police power, such is not true. No Utahns have been damaged in any respect by the 
conduct of Respondents and under Utah law the Division's right to impair contracts is 
subject to such reasonable policing regulations as may be enacted to promote the public 
good. Golding v. Shubach Optical Co.. 93 U. 32. 70 P.2d 871. For instance, no public good 
is possibly served by putting Respondents out of business merely for fulfilling their 
obligations as NASD members. On the other hand, surely it is not the Division's position that 
it is compelled to discipline Respondents to protect them from themselves as in the case of 
jay-walking — a crime within a state's police power for that very reason. 
Based on the foregoing, the August 29, Order skirts the entire issue of 
pre-emption and comity, ignoring the Exchange Act and Supremacy and Commerce Clauses 
in their entirety, and erroneously concludes that the instant proceedings are within the 
legitimate police power of the state of Utah when they are not. For these reasons, the 
August 29. Order must be reversed and vacated and Respondents' motion to dismiss should 
be granted without further delay. 
D. The Judge's Order of August 29 is non-responsive and otherwise fails to 
address the specific issue before it. namely whether the Division has the kind of subject 
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matter Jurisdiction which Congress has exclusively delegated to federal courts, and 
therefore It must be vacated. 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss was directed solely to the issue of whether or 
not the Division has subject-matter Jurisdiction to override SEC and NASD rules and 
regulations. This issue was not properly addressed by the Administrative Law Judge in the 
August 29. Order, and in fact, the Judge erroneously treated Respondents9 Motion as one 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon its relief can be granted. Assuming the Division 
has subject-matter Jurisdiction, which it could not. Respondents have little dispute with the 
fact that the Division has the police power to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer or 
agent for "dishonest or unethical practices*. This is clearly set forth In §61-1-6(1 )(g). 
Contrary to Respondents' Motion, hbwever. the August 29. Order merely concludes that the 
Division has stated a claim under §61-1-6(1 Kg). Utah Code Ann. Such is not and never was 
the purpose of Respondents' Motion. Once it could be established, however, that the 
Division has subject-matter Jurisdiction, the issue of whether or not the amended petitions 
state a claim, constitutionally or otherwise, can be addressed.4 Unfortunately, these issues 
are not now and never were before the Administrative Law Judge on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
and therefore the Order of August 29. is entirely non-responsive and irrelevant to the 
specific Jurisdictional issue. Such Order should thus be reversed accordingly. 
E. The Order appealed from contains irrelevant and erroneous findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and otherwise tends to address the merits of the Division's case, 
and therefore it should be vacated. 
4
 Respondents emphasize that the actual constitutionality of the Division's Amended 
Petitions based on equal protection, due process, void for vagueness, and privileges and 
Immunities, etc.. arguments are not at issue here and are more properly the prospective subject 
of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
-26-
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Respondents object to the August 29. Order in that it contains irrelevant and 
erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of law which are neither admitted, pleaded, nor 
in evidence. It also tends to improperly address the merits of the Division's case and 
because it is non-responsive as outlined in the previous argument, it should be vacated. 
For instance, the August 29. Order fails to find that Respondents are members of the NASD 
and are subject to SEC and NASD rules and regulations specifically delegated to such 
organizations by Congress under the Exchange Act. The Order further fails to find that 
disputes, obligations, liabilities, and duties contemplated in the Exchange Act can only be 
brought or determined in a federal court as unequivocally set forth in §27 thereof. It 
further fails to find that the Division can inconsistently regulate a broker-dealer under the 
present fact situtation without violating §28(a) of the Exchange Act. The Order further 
erroneously holds that Respondents* "purchase** of shares of U.S.A. Medical corporation 
stock to complete its outstanding federal obligations is a "willful failure** to comply with the 
Division's March 1.1989. Summary Order suspending exemptions for the offer and sale of 
such securities in Utah and only in Utah. Again, whether the March 1. Order prohibited 
"purchases" is irrelevant to whether or not the Division has jurisdiction to regulate or 
adjudicate contrary to the mandates of the Exchange Act. 
The August 29. Order erroneously concludes on top of page 4 thereof that 
"NASD rules of conduct [sic] should not be accorded the force and effect of federal law" 
This startling conclusion is completely belied by S§15.15A. 27. and 28(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act. including Western Capital and Securities, supra. The Order further 
erroneously concludes that the purchase of securities after March 1. 1989 merely to effect 
delivery of securities previously "sokT to third parties was "squarely at odds with the 
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operative effect of the March 1. 1989 Summary Order." As set forth in the Statement of 
Material Facts above, no exemption is required to "purchase" securities and this conclusion 
is further erroneous, let alone irrelevant, as a matter of state or federal law. The August 
29. Order thus leads one to the erroneous conclusion that Respondents had actual notice of 
how the Division would unilaterally interpret its March 1. Order. This is not true. Further, it 
assumes that the Division acted properly in proceeding against Respondents by way of its 
petitions as opposed to rulemaking and this again evidences that the Order treats 
Respondents' Motion as one to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In short, the Order is 
erroneous In concluding that "any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as 
a member of that self-regulatory organization does not lend support to the conclusion that 
the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case." Again, if a state court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction to address Exchange Act mandates and provisions, it is 
malignantly preposterous to conclude that the Division, a mere agent of Utah courts, would 
have such subject-matter jurisdiction. See §27 of the Exchange Act. By concluding that 
Respondents' conduct was "squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1.1989 
Summary Order", the Administrative Law Judge has further made a determination which 
tends to go to the merits and which is beyond the scope of Respondents' Motion. In 
addition, the August 29. Order further compels the erroneous legal conclusion that 
Respondents' conduct effected an unlawful "distribution" to Utah residents as this Is the 
only legal conclusion that would justify the Division's Amended Petitions under its police 
powers. That Respondents effected an unlawful distribution to Utah residents is belied by 
the facts as in point of fact, all stock purchased by Respondents was "exported" 
out-of-state. Respondents' conduct therefore had no impact or relationship to Utah or 
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Utah residents. Simply put. the August 29. Order fails to properly address the simple 
jurisdictional issue that was before such court. 
F. The August 29. Order erroneously concludes that the Division has power 
and authority to give extra-territorial effect to its March 1, Order, an interpretation which is 
not in the Order itself and which further violates the Division's enabling act, the Exchange 
Act, and the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. 
One of the salient problems with the August 29. Order is that it erroneously 
gives the Division's March 1. Order an unlawful extra-territorial effect on other states and 
other state residents. The purpose of Respondents' post-March 1. purchases of U.S.A. 
Medical stock was merely to fulfill interstate obligations. Such purchases had nothing to do 
with Utah or Utah residents, nor didlt harm, damage, or injure any Utah residents. Certainly 
those who sold their U.SA. Medical stock to Respondents are not complaining that they now 
want their worthless stock back, nor would it conceivably appear that the Division is now 
proceeding against Respondents on such sellers' behalf so as to protect them. Clearly, the 
only reason Respondents had to purchase such securities from Utah residents is the simple 
fact that virtually all of the outstanding U.S A Medical stock was in the state of Utah! This 
is evidenced by the official record in the Judge Greene proceedings. Ironically, at the 
hearing on Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the Division argued that a purchase by 
Respondents from an out-of-state resident would not have changed the Division's position 
in regard to Respondents' alleged "dishonest or unethical" conduct. For this reason, it is 
clear that whether Respondents purchased the stock from Utah residents or not. the 
August 29. Order holds that Respondents, as Utah residents, violated the Division's March 1. 
Order and thereby engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices'*. To be sure, two of the 
- 2 9 -
0005 
parties from whom Respondents purchased securities who are identified in the Amended 
Petitions are Sheldon and Lois Flateman. New York residents. At the hearing, the Division 
argued that the Flatemans themselves violated the Division's March 1. Order. Such an 
argument evidences that the Division considers its March 1, Order to have unlawful 
extra-territorial effect by suspending exemptions in other states such as the state of New 
York. This untenable and preposterous position is antithetical to well-settled conflicts of 
law problems in the Blue Sky area. See Lintz v. Carey Manor. Ltd.. 613 F. Supp. 543. 550-51 
(D.C. Va. 1985) (holding that two separtate states* Blue Sky laws cannot be interpreted as 
being mutually exclusive). The foregoing also compels the inevitable legal conclusion that 
any out-of-state entity which bought stock for the account of Johnson-Bowles after March 
1. would have similarly violated the Division's March 1. Order. If this is so. then it would have 
been impossible for Respondents to have ever honored their Exchange Act commitments 
without violating the Division's March 1. Order. 
The Division apparently attempts to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over 
these proceedings under §61-1-26 which provides that a transaction occurs in Utah if the 
"buy" occurs here. Based on this contention, however, it would have been impossible for 
Respondents, as Utah residents, to have purchased U.S.A. Medical stock from anyone, 
anywhere, without having arguably violated the Division's March 1. Order and Its unlawful 
and unilateral interpretation thereof. The foregoing results in but another necessary legal 
conclusion that the Division's March 1.1989. Order has been given unlawful extra-territorial 
effect by the Judge's Order of August 29. Certainly, under another state's Blue Sky laws, an 
out-of-state resident has every right to sell his or her U.S.A. Medical stock to anybody he 
wants, and if not. the Division is assuming power and authority no less expansive under the 
C0055 
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Commerce Clause than the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (See Singer v. 
Magnavox. cited in Respondents' Supporting Memoranda on file herein holding that It is 
unlawful to give extra-territorial effect to a state's Blue Sky laws). It Is thus undisputed 
that the Division's attempt to prevent Respondents from completing Interstate commerce 
transactions has the practical effect of regulating and controlling conduct beyond the 
boundaries of Utah in violation of the Commerce Clause. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. 
325 U.S.761. 775 (1945). The limits on a state's power to enact substantive legislation are 
similar to the limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case, "any attempt 
'directly' to assert extra-territorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend 
sister States and exceed the inherent limits of a State's power." Schafer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186. 197(1977). 
The second reason, alluded to above, why the August 29. Order unlawfully 
gives extra-territorial effect to the Division's March 1. Order is that it would prohibit 
"buy-ins" by the various out-of-state broker-dealers and clearing corporations "for the 
account" of Johnson-Bowles. There is absolutely no difference between Johnson-Bowles' 
purchase of U.S.A. Medical stock to cover its "short position" or the purchase by its clearing 
agents of U.S.A. Medical stock "for its own account". In other words, the necessary legal 
conclusion that must be drawn from the August 29. Order and the Division's position in that 
regard is that any "buy-ins" for Johnson-Bowles' account would have just as readily 
resulted in a violation of the Division's March 1. Order. In other words, what difference 
does it make who buys the stock if it is for Johnson-Bowles? Such a violation would 
apparently be not only on the part of Johnson-Bowles but also on the part of each 
out-of-state entity which the Division has no authority or jurisdiction to regulate. This is 
C005G 
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again because Johnson-Bowles is a Utah resident and it makes no difference whether 
Johnson-Bowles purchased the stock itself or such was purchased by someone else for its 
own account from the state of Utah or anywhere else. It makes absolutely no difference. 
The August 29, Order erroneously affirms the Division's jurisdiction to prevent 
out-of-state broker-dealers and clearing corporations or agents from "evening our their 
accounts with Johnson-Bowles — an obviously unlawful extra-territorial effect violative of 
the Commerce Clause. While the August 29, Order infers that Johnson-Bowles should have 
allowed such "buy-ins", the Judge forgets that the subject out-of-state entities would have 
had to purchase stock from the state of Utah inasmuch as virtually all of the stock of U.S.A. 
Medical was in the state of Utah. This is further not to ignore that had Respondents 
allowed the out-of-state brokers and clearing agents to purchase U.S.A. Medical stock at 
any price they could get it. Respondents would have been out of business as 
Johnson-Bowles hadn't the capital to afford open-ended "buy-ins". For this reason, the 
fact that Johnson-Bowles purchased the stock itself for its own account as opposed to 
negligently allowing someone else to purchase it for its own account is a distinction without 
any difference. The August 29. Order concluded the contrary and is thus further error 
justifying reversal and the granting of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. 
The August 29. Order confers an additional extra-territorial effect on the 
March 1. Order. This is because such Order is construed as permitting the halting of 
trading of over-the-counter securities on an exclusively interstate basis as evidenced in 
this case. Unfortunately for the Division, any authority to halt over-the-counter trading is 
exclusively reserved to the NASD in SEC Ex. Act Rel. 25. 669. 40 SEC Dock.1123 (1988). 
Therefore, the Division's Order is in further conflict with SEC and NASD rules and 
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regulations, the specific power and authority over which Is exclusively delegated to federal 
courts, not the Division, under the Exchange Act. The Division's Order, as interpreted by it. 
thus encroaches upon the NASD's exclusive trading suspension authority. Again, these 
points mandate that the instant proceedings be dismissed and that the August 29. Order be 
reversed. 
Based on the fact that the August 29. Order unlawfully gives extra-territorial 
effect to the Division's March 1. Order, such Order and the instant administrative 
proceedings themselves are violative of the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the 
Constitution. Thus, the Administrative Law Judge's Order must be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress tells Respondents to stand, the Divison is disciplining them for 
not sitting; when Congress tells Respondents to leap, the Division seeks to discipline them 
for not lying down; when Congress has told Respondents that honoring their trades is an 
"ethical" mandate or the NASD will subject them to severe penalties, the Division has told 
them such is "unethical" or "dishonest" and their licenses will be revoked. No regulation 
could conceivably be more conflicting or paint anyone into a greater corner from which he 
or she cannot extricate themselves. 
If Respondents' conduct is "unethical- or "dishonest", even in light of the 
Exchange Act, Respondents would like to know who the mysterious person is who is the 
recipient of such alleged "unethical" or "dishonest" behavior. Surely, its not a Utah resident 
or anyone else and the Division has yet to identify any such phantom who needs the 
protection of its alleged "police power". 
G0058 
- 3 3 -
Since preemption and comity come into play as a matter of law when a state 
regulation or activity conflicts with a federal mandate and subjects someone like 
Respondents to conflicting regulation, the Administrative Law Judge's ruling on 
Respondents' motion to dismiss is fundamental error and must be reversed. If not. the 
instant proceedings wilt continue to subject Respondents to incurring additional irreparable 
damage to their business, including unwarranted attorney's fees, all of which are wholly 
unnecessary in law. fact, or reality. 
DATED this 11th day of September. 1) 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 11th day of September. 1989. 
(s)he hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN 
SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW AND HEARING THEREON to John C. Baldwin, 
Director and Kathleen C. McGinley. Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division. 
Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and presiding officer J. Stephen Eklund, Esq.. 
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; and mailed the same to Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 
State Capitol. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114; and Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan. 
& Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor. Kennecott BIdg.. 10 East South Temple 
Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84133. 
J:BRIEF.1-12 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Marian Vernon Johnson, on his oath, deposes and says the following on behalf of 
respondents in the above-entitled matters ^nd in support of their motion to dismiss on file 
herein: 
1. That your affiant is a respondent In the above-matters and he has personal 
knowledge of that which is contained herein. He is also a principal of Johnson-Bowles 
EXHIBIT k 
Company. Inc.. also a respondent in these matters, and he has power and authority to make 
this affidavit on its behalf. 
2. That your affiant is a registered principal and registered representative with the 
National Association of Securities Dealers. Inc. ("NASD"), a self-regulatory organization 
governed exclusively under the express provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
3. That respondent Johnson-Bowles Company Inc. is a broker-dealer registered, 
licensed with, and specifically regulated by the NASD as further exclusively governed under 
the express provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
4. That after Johnson-Bowles filed a lawsuit in federal court on February 16.1989 
against U.SA Medical Corporation, et al.. case no. C-89-157-G. in an effort to uncover the 
so-called "short squeeze** orchestrated by named-defendants therein, your affiant was in 
regular and continual contact with the NASD in Denver, specifically with one Kenneth 
Schaeffer. the NASD Regional Office Assistant Director. 
5. That your affiant kept Mr. Schaeffer fully informed of the federal case and 
furnished him personally with copies of the Complaint. Judge J. Thomas Greene's formal 
order of February 28.1989. and also the Utah Securities Division's Order of March 1. the 
latter of which is the sole subject of the Instant proceedings. 
6. That subsequent to March 1.1989. your affiant had numerous conversations with 
Assistant Director Schaef fer about Johnson-Bowies' "short position" In the securities of 
U.S A Medical and your affiant can attest that Mr. Schaef fer was fully advised In all 
particulars and at all times. On nearly each occasion. Mr. Schaef fer reminded your affiant 
00067 
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of respondents' obligations to fulfill and consummate their outstanding brokerage 
contracts as required under the NASO Rules of Fair Practice. 
7. That even though Mr. Schaeffer was aware of the Division's March 1, 1989 Order. 
Mr. Schaeffer specifically informed your affiant in no uncertain terms that respondents 
must fulfill their overriding NASD obligations or face possible serious disciplinary action. 
That such warnings were understood by your affiant to not exclude expulsion from the 
NASD — the result of which would mean the end of respondents* business as being in good 
stead with the NASD is the lif eblood of any broker-dealer. 
8. That based on your affiant's unequivocal conversations with Mr. Schaeffer and 
because respondents are directly and daily regulated by the NASD in all particulars, your 
affiant believed respondents had no choice whatsoever but to purchase U.SA Medical 
stock to consummate their outstanding Exchange Act transactions in such securities — 
transactions that had each and all been entered into prior to the date of the Division's 
March 1. Order. In other words, in light of the present state administrative proceedings, 
respondents have relied to their detriment on the warnings and admonitions of the NASD by 
and through Mr. Schaeffer. Further, your affiant was aware of the SEC Interpretative 
Release attached to respondents' Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "ET and was under 
the obviously reasonable impression that respondents' conduct was permissible under the 
federal regulatory scheme without question. 
9. That your affiant never interpreted the Division's March 1. Order — the exclusive 
subject of these proceedings —as prohibiting or even remotely relating to respondents' 
obligations to complete their outstanding brokerage contracts. To be sure, the Division's 
00068 
- 3 -
Petitions are belied by the very language of the Order itself. Further, that at no time were 
respondents advised by counsel, the Division, the SEC. the NASD, or anyone else that 
fulfilling their outstanding NASD contracts would or even could be deemed a violation of the 
Division's March 1. Order — an Order which relates only to sales or offers to sell. This is 
particularly true when the SEC. the NASD, and the Securities Division were well aware and 
fully apprised of all that was transpiring in the U.S.A. Medical litigation. As a matter of fact, 
the Division had two attorneys present on February 27 and 28 at the preliminary injunction 
hearing before U.S. District Judge Greene. Further, your affiant believes that Mr. Schaeffer 
similarly did not. by any stretch of the imagination, so misconstrue the Division's Order as 
the Division itself is now doing as your affiant believes that Mr. Schaeffer would have 
certainly communicated something in that regard to respondents, which he did not at any 
time. 
10. That in the event that the Division has subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant 
administrative proceedings, your affiant can attest that respondents are and have been 
subject to grossly competing and confScting regulation on the part of the NASD, the SEC. 
and the Utah Securities Division — contradictory regulation that no business or 
businessman should be required to face, let alone tolerate. In other words, the damages 
respondents have sustained as a result of the instant proceedings is incalculable in that 
respondents have been forced to amend all Form B-D and U-4 forms, they have had to 
notify each state securities commission or division in which they do business, they have 
been denied the ability to register as a broker-dealer In the State of Arizona (and as a result 
lost a valuable and loyal employee), and they have had to amend several offering circulars 
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they are presently underwriting to disclose and reflect the instant proceedings, disclosures 
that make the completion of such offerings virtually impossible. All of this because the 
Division never bothered to determine whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction and 
whether the instant actions were repugnant to superseding federal law specifically enacted 
to exclusively regulate respondents. Based on the foregoing, including respondent's 
Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, your affiant believes that the instant 
actions must be dismissed with prejudice. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this 13th day of July. 1989. 
*rs$£4. 
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EXHIBIT "K" 
5-89 NASD Manual—Rules of Fair Practice 2 0 1 3 - 3 
"Act" 
(1) The term "Act" means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended 
"Fixed Price Offering" 
(m) The term "fixed price offering" means the offering of securities at a stated 
public offering price or prices, all or part of which securities are publicly offered in the 
United States or any territory thereof, whether or not registered under the Securities 
Act of 1933, except that the term does not include offerings of "exempted securities" or 
"municipal securities" as those terms are defined in Sections 3(a)(12) and 3(a)(29), 
respectively, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or offerings of redeemable 
securities of investment companies registered pursuant to the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 which are offered at prices determined by the net asset value of the 
securities 
H 2102 Definitions in By-Laws 
Sec. 2. Unless the context otherwise requires, or unless defined in this Article, 
terms used in the Rules and provisions hereby adopted, if defined in the By-Laws, shall 
have the meaning as defined in the By-Laws 
ARTICLE III 
Rules of Fair Practice 
11 2151 Business Conduct of Members 
Sec. 1. A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of 
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade 
• • • Cross References 
"Filing of Misleading Information as to Membership or Registration" 
H1791 
"Failure to Register Personnel" H 1791 
"Fair Dealing with Customers" 1f 2152 
"NASD Mark-Up Policy" 112154 
I "Manipulative and Deceptive Quotations" U 2155 
"Policy with Respect to Firmness of Quotations" 1f 2156 
" Third Market' Confirmations" 1f 2162 
"Refusal to Abide by Rulings of the Uniform Practice Committee" 
U 3502 
"Failure to Act Under Provisions of Code of Arbitration Procedure" 
113744 
"Prompt Payment by Members for Shares of Investment Companies" 
1(5265 
"-Breakpoint* Sales" 1(5266 
Annotations of selected SEC decisions 
Execution and Delivery 
10 Failure to Execute Customer Orders.— 
In 1977, the firm acted as managing underwriter 
of a registered public offering of 385,000 Jhirmack 
Enterprises, Inc , secunties The underwriting 
syndicate distributed 398,200 shares, resulting in 
a short position of 13,200 shares when distribution 
closed on March 24, 1977 Subsequently, BEHR 
became Jhirmack s primary market maker and 
placed quotations in the NASDAQ System On 
March 25 BEHR began trading the stock in the 
OTC market The conduct of which NASD com 
plained occurred in after market trading by 
BEHR on March 25, 28, and 29 
On March 25 BEHR had customer orders to 
buv 40 000 shares of Jhirmack However BEHR 
NASD Manual Art^  111, Sec. 1 H 2151.10 
EXHIBIT "L 
1402 7-3-90 Agency Review— § 19(c) 19,317 
.16 AMEX was asked to correct deficiencies Exchange, Inc (SEC 1977), 77 78 CCH Dec 
in proposed rule changes.—American Stock fi 81,177 
[H 26,294] [Commission's Abrogation of Self-Regulatory Organization's 
Rules] 
I Sec. 19(c) The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from (hereinafter in this subsection collectively referred to as "amend") the rules of a self regulatory organiza 
fc tion (other than a registered clearing agency) as the Commission deems necessary or 
^ appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self regulatory organization, to conform 
j its rules to requirements of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to 
such organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title, in the following 
I manner 
.001 Historical comment.— 
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 16, 89 Stat 150, 
amended Sec 19(c) which formerly read 
"The Commission is authorized and directed to 
make a study and investigation of the rules of 
national securities exchanges with respect to the 
classification of members, the methods or election 
of officers and committees to insure a fair repre-
sentation of the membership, and the suspension, 
expulsion, and disciplining of members of such 
exchanges The Commission shall report to the 
Congress on or before January 3, 1935, the results 
of its investigation, together with its recommen-
dations " CCH 
.001 Historical comment.— 
Sec 19(cXl) was added by Act of June 4, 1975, 
Sec 16,89 Stat 150 
.001 Historical comment.— 
Sec 19(cX2) was added by Act of June 4, 1975, 
Sec 16,89 Stat 150 
.001 Historical comment.— 
Sec 19<cX3) was added by Act of June 4, 1975, 
Sec 16,89 Stat 150 
.10 Commission-initiated changes in the 
rules of the self-regulatory organization — 
This subsection embodies two principal changes in 
existing Section 19(b) First, the SEC would be 
granted the power to change the rules of a self 
regulatory organization in any respect, not just 
with respect to certain enumerated areas Second, 
the procedures that the SEC must follow in utihz 
mg this power would be clearly specified —Senate 
Committee Report No 94 75 (1975), page 131 
.15 Exchanges—Duty to protect inves-
tors—Reasonable diligence —See fl 21,310 37 
[126,295] [Notice of Proposed Rule Amendment] 
I Sec 19(c) 
£ (1) The Commission shall notify the self regulatory organization and publish notice of 
* the proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register The notice shall include the text of the 
*r proposed amendment to the rules oi the self-regulatory organization and a statement oi the 
I Commission's reasons, including any pertinent facts, for commencing such proposed rulemak-
I mg 
[1 26,296] [Presentations Relating to Proposed Rule Amendment] 
I Sec. 19(c) 
* (2) The Commission shall give interested persons an opportunity for the oral presenta 
*7 tion of data, views, and arguments, in addition to an opportunity to make written submis-
I sions A transcript shall be kept of any oral presentation 
[126,297] [Commission Statement Concerning Rule Amendment] 
I Sec 19(c) 
I (3) A rule adopted pursuant to this subsection shall incorporate the text of the amend 
J ment to the ruks of the self-regulatory organization and a statement of the Commission's 
i3 basis for and purpose in so amending such rules This statement shall include an identifica 
I tion of any facts on which the Commission considers its determination so to amend the rules 
of the self-regulatory agency to be based, including the reasons for the Commission's 
I conclusions as to any of such facts which were disputed in the rulemaking 
Federal Securities Law Reports Law § 19(c)(3) 1f 26,297 
EXHIBIT "M" 
bl-l-b SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am Jur 2d Securities Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» I8V2 (37), Se-
Regulation — State § 18 cunties Regulation «=» 272 
C.J.S. — 79 C J S Supp Securities Regula-
tion § 196 
61-1-6, Denial, suspension, or revocation of registration — 
Grounds — Procedure — Examination. 
(1) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, suspend-
ing, or revoking any agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser registration 
if he finds that the order is in the public interest and that the applicant or 
registrant or, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any part-
ner, officer, or director, or any person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling the broker-
dealer or investment adviser 
(a) filed an application for registration that was incomplete m any 
material respect or contained any statement that was, m light of the 
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect 
to any material fact, 
(b) willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with any provision of 
this chapter or a predecessor act or any rule or order under this chapter or 
a predecessor act, 
(c) was convicted, withm the past ten years, of any misdemeanor in-
volving a security or any aspect of the securities business, or any felony; 
(d) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by any court of competent 
jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in-
volving any aspect of the securities business, 
(e) is the subject of an order of the executive director or any predecessor 
denying, suspending, or revoking registration as a broker-dealer, agent, 
or investment adviser, 
(f) (1) is the subject of an order entered within the past five years by 
the securities administrator of any other state or by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission denying or revoking registration as a 
broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser, or the substantial equiv-
alent of those terms as defined in this chapter, or is the subject of an 
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending or ex-
pelling him from a national securities exchange or national securities 
association registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or 
is the subject of a United States Post Office fraud order 
(11) The division may not institute a revocation or suspension pro-
ceeding under this Subsection (f) more than one year from the date of 
the order relied on, and the executive director may not enter an order 
under this Subsection (f) on the ba,sis of an order under another state 
act unless that order was based on facts that would currently consti-
tute a ground for an order under this section, 
(g) engaged m dishonest or unethical practices in the securities busi-
ness, 
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(h) is insolvent, either in the sense that his liabilities exceed his assets 
or in the sense that he cannot meet his obligations as they mature. How-
ever, the executive director may not enter an order against a broker-
dealer or investment adviser under this Subsection (h) without a finding 
of insolvency as to the broker-dealer or investment adviser; or 
(i) is not qualified on the basis of such factors as training, experience, 
and knowledge of the securities business, except as otherwise provided in 
Subsection (3). 
(2) (a) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Secu-
rities Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, 
suspending, or revoking any registration, if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest and that the applicant or registrant: 
(i) has failed reasonably to supervise his agents if he is a broker-
dealer or his employees if he is an investment adviser; or 
(ii) has failed to pay the proper filing fee. 
(b) The division may enter a denial order under this subsection, but 
shall vacate the order when the deficiency has been corrected. 
(c) The division may not institute a suspension or revocation proceed-
ing on the basis of a fact or transaction known to it when registration 
became effective unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 30 
days. 
(3) The following provisions govern the application of Subsection 
61-1-6(1X1): 
(a) The executive director may not enter an order against a broker-
dealer on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other than 
the broker-dealer himself if he is an individual or an agent of the broker-
dealer. 
(b) The executive director may not enter an order against an invest-
ment adviser on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other 
than the investment adviser himself if he is an individual or any other 
person who represents the investment adviser in doing any of the acts 
which make him an investment adviser. 
(c) The executive director may not enter an order solely on the basis of 
lack of experience if the applicant or registrant is qualified by training or 
knowledge. 
(d) The executive director shall consider that an agent who will work 
under the supervision of a registered broker-dealer need not have the 
same qualifications as a broker-dealer. 
(e) The executive director shall consider that an investment adviser is 
not necessarily qualified solely on the basis of experience as a broker-
dealer or agent. When he finds that an applicant for initial or renewal 
registration as a broker-dealer is not qualified as an investment adviser, 
he may by order condition the applicant's registration as a broker-dealer 
upon his not transacting business in this state as an investment adviser. 
(f) The division shall by rule provide for examinations, which may be 
written or oral or both, to be taken by all applicants. 
(4) The division may take emergency action with respect to registration 
applications according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63. 
(5) If the division finds that any registrant or applicant for registration is 
no longer in existence, has ceased to do business as a broker-dealer, agent, or 
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investment adviser, is subject to an adjudication of mental incompetence or to 
the control of a committee, conservator, or guardian, or cannot be located after 
reasonable search, the division may by order cancel the registration or appli-
cation according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63. 
(6) (a) Withdrawal from registration as a broker-dealer, agent, or invest-
ment adviser becomes effective 30 days after receipt of an application to 
withdraw or within such shorter period of time as the division may deter-
mine, unless a revocation or suspension proceeding is pending when the 
application is filed or a proceeding to revoke or suspend or to impose 
conditions upon the withdrawal is instituted within 30 days after the 
application is filed. 
(b) If a proceeding is pending or instituted, the division shall designate 
by order when the withdrawal becomes effective. 
(c) (i) If no proceeding is pending or instituted, and withdrawal auto-
matically becomes effective, the division may initiate a revocation or 
suspension proceeding under Subsection 61-l-6(l)(b) within one year 
after withdrawal became effective. 
(ii) If the division decides to issue a revocation or suspension order, 
the executive director shall enter the order as of the last date on 
which registration was effective. 
(7) The division, board, and executive director shall comply with the proce-
dures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, befqre issuing any order 
under any part of this section. J 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-6, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 9; 1987, 
ch. 161, § 233. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Sub-
section (4) to such an extent as to make a de-
tailed analysis impracticable; in Subsection (5) 
added "according to the procedures and re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63"; in Sub-
section (6) added the internal subsection desig-
nations and in Subsection (b) substituted "the 
division shall designate by order when the 
Scope of inquiry. 
Commission had authority to inquire into 
applicant's or registrant's conduct with respect 
to unworthiness to carry on business that he or 
it was registered to carry on, irrespective of 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am Jur 2d Securities 
Regulation — State §§ 19 to 24 
C. J.S. — 79 C J S Supp Securities Regula-
tion §§ 223 to 226 
A.L.R. — Churning stockbroker's liability 
for allegedly "churning" or engaging cus-
tomer's account in excessive activity, 32 
A.L R 3d 635. 
Law practice what activities of stock or se-
withdrawal becomes effective" for "withdrawal 
becomes effective at such time and upon such 
conditions as the division by order deter-
mines", rewrote Subsection (7) to such an ex-
tent as to make a detailed analysis impractica-
ble, and made minor changes in style and 
phraseology throughout the section 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. — The 
federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, re-
ferred to in Subsection (1X0, appears as 15 
USC § 78a et seq. 
fact that securities to which inquiry was specif-
ically directed did not need to be registered 
Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc. v Monson, 102 Utah 
234,129 P 2d 887 (1942) (decided under former 
law) 
cunty broker constitute unauthorized practice 
of law, 34 A L R 3d 1305 
Mistake effect, as between stockbroker and 
customer, of broker's mistaken sale of stock or 
other security other than that intended by cus-
tomer, 48 ALR3d 513 
Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» 18V2 (38), 38, 
Securities Regulation *=> 270, 274, 277 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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61-1-27 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
successor executor or administrator which grows out of that conduct and 
which is brought under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with the 
same force and validity as if served on him personally. Service may be made 
by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the division, but it is not 
effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, action, or 
proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a copy of the pro-
cess by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last known 
address or takes other steps which are reasonably calculated to give actual 
notice, and the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with this subsection is filed 
in the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such 
further time as the court allows. 
(8) When process is served under this section, the court, or the executive 
director shall order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defen-
dant or respondent reasonable opportunity to defend. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-26, enacted by L. business in state to have resident agent, Utah 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 36. Const Art. XII, Sec 9 
Cross-References. — Corporations doing 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS method of acquiring jurisdiction over one in 
^ . violation of the Securities Act, but simply gives 
Foreign contracts. .
 c , ' ! x 
In personam jurisdiction. * , s p e c ' a l m e a n s f d o , n * » ' x t dfs n o t P r e v e n t 
the obtaining of personal jurisdiction by any 
Foreign contracts. other means provided by statute and, in partic-
Act did not apply to contracts made and en-
 u l d o e s n o t l u d e t h e u s e o f § 78_27-22, 
tered into in another state United States Bond
 t h e „{ a r m g t a t u t e „ P i a n t e s y H d e n . ? *n°3 K ^ I T P 9 ^ « v.^ 7 S ^ne , Inc , 30 Utah 2d 110, 514 P2d 529 Am., 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 758, rehearing de-
 /irV7CM J , J ^ c TT o one n^  a n* 
med, 80 Utah 70, 17 P.2d 238 (1932) (decided (*9*3) ' " I * Jf™™o Y i f ?,l 
under former law) 1 5 9 9 ' 3 9 L E d 2 d 8 9 3 ' shearing denied, 416 
under former law).
 u g ^ ^ g ^ ^ ^ L ^ ^ ^ 
In personam jurisdiction. (1974) 
Subsection (7) does not provide the exclusive 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur 2d Securities Key Numbers. — Licenses «=» 18V2 (36); Se-
Regulation — State §§ 17, 92. cunties Regulation ** 271 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
tion § 198 
61-1-27. Construction of chapterJ 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the 
interpretation and administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-27, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 37. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-12 
553763-46b-ll, enacted by L. 
1987, ch . 161, § 267; 1988, ch. 72, § 21. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted 
"properly scheduled hearing after re£0*rmg 
proper notice" for "heanng^Mr^ubsec t ion 
(1Kb), designated the^wrtgfmg provisions in 
Subsection (3)a*^Jfesent Subsection (3)(a), m-
serting^>rtdany order in the adjudicative pro-
fig issued subsequent to the default or-
der," and added Subsectiojj&ibHtTunc), desig-
nated the existirjgHJTTJtfision in Subsection (4) 
nsection (4)(a), adding "In an ad-
Icative proceeding begun by a party that 
has other parties besides the party in default," 
and added Subsection (b), and made minor sty-
listic changes 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 161, 
^ 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1988 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity desig-
nated for that purpose by the statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within 
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the 
response. One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the parties 
and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the 
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the 
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the 
agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule 
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other 
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or appli-
cable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on 
review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a 
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring re-
view; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be 
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
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(vn) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties, and 
(vm) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review 
History C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L. 
1987, ch~ 161, 0 268; 1988, ch. 72, * 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the 
former introductory paragraph in Subsection 
(1) as present Subsection (l)(a) substituting 
"30da\s for ten davs" in that paragraph and 
redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (d) as 
present Subsections (l)(b)(i> to (iv), inserted "or 
within the time period provided by agency 
rule, whichever is longer" in Subsection (2), 
and made minor stylistic changes 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 161, 
^ 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1988 
^ttiMbb-U Agency review — Reconsideration; 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for wjfach 
review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-4^15-12 is 
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute fin#l agency 
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideratHMi with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing ofJtne request is not 
a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the onier 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed wit)i the agency and one 
copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue 
a written order granting the request or denying the request 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose does 
not issue an order within 20 days aftei/the filing of the request, the 
request for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied 
History: C 1953, 63-46b-13, enacted by L 
1987, ch 161, § 269; 1988, ch. 72, * 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-/ 
ment, effective April 25,1988, subdivided Sujj 
section (1) and rewrote Subsection (lKa), wf] 
had read "Within ten days after the date/ 
an order on review is issued, or within ten days 
after the date that a final order is issued for 
which agency review is unavailableyany party 
may file a written request for reconsideration 
fating the specific grounds upon which relief 
' i s requested", deleted "or the order on review" 
at the end in Subsection (l)(b) and substituted 
"reconsideration" for "rehearing" in Subsection 
(3)(b) 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 161, 
** 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1988 
63-46b-14. Judicial review 
tive remedies-
Exhaustion of administra-
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute 
(2) A partVmay seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that 
(al/a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
reinedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
squired, 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust anv or all administrative remedies if 
(l) the administrative remedies are inadequate, or 
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1356 9-2089 1 8 , 5 1 1 
Correlator 
SECURITIES ASSOCIATIONS 
and 
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES DEALERS 
and 
Gov't Securities Brokers and Dealers 
A preliminary discussion introducing the subjects covered in this division. Use it for 
quick review of the high points of the detailed "compilation " of decisions, rulings and 
comment following 
Registered Securities Associations 
Brokerelnd* °f ^he authority and criteria for the registration of associations of 
Dealers brokers and dealers are set forth in Section 15A of the Exchange Act 
(1f25,501 and following); the procedure for registration, however, is 
governed by Section 19 of the Exchange Act flf 26,241 and following). Though Section 
15A deals with registration as an affiliated securities association (1(25,631), as well as 
registration as a national securities association (1f25,50l), the latter is the principal 
category. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) is registered 
with the Commission since 1939 as a registered securities association. (The NASD is 
the only association so registered.) Registration of an association as a national or as an 
affiliated securities association is effected by filing a registration statement on Form 
X-15AA-1 with the SEC (fl 25,502). 
Reg?™at?on ^ e s t a t u t o r v criteria for registration as a national securities associa-
tion are, for the most part, stated in terms of what the rules of the 
association must or may not provide. For example, the rules must be designed to 
protect investors, prevent fraud and foster equitable principles of trade in accordance 
with specific requirements and prohibitions of the statute (f 25,591) and they may 
impose no unnecessary burden on competition (fl 25,613). 
The association must have compliance enforcement ability (jf 25,561) and, to the 
extent applicable, requirements relating to affiliated securities associations must be 
met (f25,615 and 25,621). Association rules must meet standards as to selection of 
directors (1(25,589), disciplinary matters (1(25,601), fair procedure (K 25,611 and 
25,675 and following), equitable allocation of dues (K 25,590), membership and associa-
tion with a member (1(25,570 and 25,671—25,671F), quotations (1(25,616) and deal-
ings with nonmember professionals flf 25,651—25,655). 
For purposes of Section 15A—other than Section 15A(g)(3) relating to standards 
for membership and association with a member—municipal securities are not treated 
as exempted securities (K 21,191). Broker-dealer transactions in exempted securities are 
within the association's rulemaking authority only to a limited extent (K 25,661). 
A registered securities association may not make rules concerning transactions by 
a registered broker or dealer in a municipal security (f 25,665). 
Some criteria are modified in the case of registration of affiliated associations 
(1(25,631—25,645). 
Federal Securities Law Report! Correlator 
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Sec. 15A(b) 
(2) Such association is so organized and has the capacity to be able to carry out the 
purposes of this title and to comply, and (subject to any rule or order of the Commission 
pursuant to section 17(d) or 19(g)(2) of this title) to enforce compliance by its members and 
persons associated with its members, with the provisions of this title, the rules and regula 
tions thereunder, the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the rules of the 
association 
001 Historical comment.— 
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 12(2), effective 
December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 127, amended Sec 
15A(bX2) which formerly read 
"such association is so organized and is of such 
a character as to be able to comply with the 
provisions of this title and the rules and regula-
tions thereunder, and to carry out the purposes of 
this section " 
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(a)(1), 78 Stat 
574, deleted the semicolon at the end of para 
graph (2) of Sec 15A(b) and inserted the 
period —CCH 
[1125,570] [Membership in Association] 
3 
Sec. 15A(b) 
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (g) of this section, the rules of the association 
provide that any registered broker or dealer may become a member of such association and 
any person may become associated with a member thereof 
001 Historical comment.— 
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 12(2), effective 
December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 127, amended Sec 
15A(bX3) which formerly read 
"the rules of the association provide that any 
broker or dealer who makes use of the mails or 
any means or instrumentality of interstate com 
merce to effect any transaction in, or to induce 
the purchase or sale of, any security otherwise 
than on a national securities exchange, may 
become a member of such association, except such 
as are excluded pursuant to paragraph (4) or (5) 
of this subsection, or a rule of the association 
permitted under this paragraph The rules of the 
association may restrict membership in such asso-
ciation on such specified geographical basis, or on 
such specified basis relating to the type of busi-
ness done by its members, or on such other speci-
fied and appropriate basis, as appears to the 
Commission to be necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors 
and to carry out the purpose of this section Rules 
adopted by the association may provide that the 
association may, unless the Commission directs 
otherwise in cases in which the Commission finds 
it appropriate in the public interest so to direct, 
deny admission to or refuse to continue in such 
association any broker or dealer if— 
(A) such broker or dealer, whether prior or 
subsequent to becoming such, or 
(B) any person associated with such broker or 
dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becom-
ing so associated, 
has been and is suspended or expelled from a 
national securities exchange or has been and is 
barred or suspended from being associated with 
all members of such exchange, for violation of any 
rule of such exchange " 
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(a), 78 Stat 
574—575, amended paragraph (3) of Sec 
15A(b), which formerly read as follows. 
'the rules of the association provide that any 
broker or dealer who makes use of the mails or of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate com 
merce to effect any transaction in, or to induce 
the purchase or sale of, any security otherwise 
than on a national securities exchange, may 
become a member of such association, except such 
as are excluded pursuant to paragraph (4) of this 
subsection Provided, That the rules of the associ 
ation may restrict membership in such association 
on such specified geographical basis, or on such 
specified basis relating to the type of business 
done by its members, or on such other specified 
and appropriate basis, as appears to the Commis-
sion to be necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors and to 
carry out the purpose of this section,"—CCH 
[1125,581] [Denial of Membership to Certain Persons] 
[The provisions relating to denial of membership in a securities association which were formerly 
contained in Section 15A(bX4) prior to December 1, 1975 are now contained in Section 15A(g) See 
1f25,671--25,671K CCH] 
• Regulations 
1)25,570 Law § 15A(b)(2) ©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
18,550 Securities Associations—Municipal Securities 1388 4-17-90 
.001 Historical comment.— 
For text of Sec 15A(bX5) in effect prior to 
December 1, 1975, see fl 25.671D 001 
The provisions relating to allocation of dues 
were formerly contained in Sec 15A(bX7) Prior 
to amendment by the Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 
12(2), effective December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 127, 
paragraph (7) of Sec 15A(b) read 
'the rules of the association provide for the 
equitable allocation of dues among its members 
to defray reasonable expenses of administration 
Act of August 20 1964 Sec 7(aX4), 78 State 
574, 575 redesignated paragraph (6) of Section 
001 Historical comment — 
For text of Sec 15A(bX6) in effect prior to 
December 1, 1975, see fl 25,589 001 
The provisions relating to the prevention of 
fraudulent acts and practices were formerly con 
tamed in Sec 15A(bX8) Prior to amendment by 
the Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 12(2), effective 
December 1 1975, 89 Stat 127, paragraph (8) of 
Sec 15A(b)read 
"the rules of the association are designed to 
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and 
practices, to promote just and equitable principles 
of trade, to provide safeguards against unreasona 
ble profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or 
.09 Scope of self-regulatory authority—1975 
amendments.— 
1125,590.10 Law § 15A(b)(6) 
15A(b) as paragraph (7) and replaced the semico-
lon at the end of the paragraph with a period — 
CCH 
10 Dues not to exceed reasonable expenses 
and to be fairly allocated —' This paragraph 
has a dual purpose First, to provide that the total 
of dues assessed against the members of an associ 
ation shall not exceed an amount necessary to 
defray reasonable expenses of administration sec 
ond, to provide that such dues shall be fairly 
allocated among the members of the associa 
tion "—House Committee Report No 2307 
(1938), 75th Cong 3d Sess 
other charges, and, in general, to protect investors 
and the public interest and to remove impedi 
ments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and 
open market and are not designed to permit 
Unfair discrimination between customers or issu 
ers, or brokers or dealer, to fix minimum profits, 
to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose any 
Schedule or fix minimum rates of commissions, 
allowances discounts, or other charges ' 
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(aX4), 78 Stat 
574, 575, redesignated paragraph (7) of Section 
l5A(b) as paragraph (8), and replaced the semico-
lon at the end of the paragraph with a period — 
CCH 
Under the bill the scope of the rule making 
authority and responsibility of all self regulatory 
organizations would be defined in terms of pur 
©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
25,591 J [Rules to Promote Just and Equitable Principles of Trade] 
Sec 15A(b) 
(6) The rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts 
and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and 
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information 
with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities to remove impediments to and 
perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and in 
general, to protect investors and the public interest, and are not designed to permit unfair 
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, to fix minimum profits, to 
impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts or other fees to be 
charged by its members, or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this UtJe 
matters not related to the purposes of this title or the administration of the association 
• • • Annotations by Topic 
Committee report 10 
Compensations for transactions in tax exempt bonds 
30 
Constitutionality 
"Void for vagueness" 60 
Construction of rule 12 
Deficiencies in books and records—Rule violations, 
options 126 
Distribution to another broker-dealer 23 
Enforcement of NASD rule by exchange 41 
Excessive mark-ups 25, 27 
Failure to remit dividend 16 
Failure to supervise 125, 17, 18 
Hot issue offerings—NASD interpretation 232 
"In and out" privilege—NASD interpretation 
122 
Payments to another broker-dealer 20 
Private cause of action— 
NASD violation 5 
Procedure 
Collateral attack 123 
Judicial refusal to enforce NASD rule 145 
Motion for discovery 146 
Sanctions 124 
Stay of jurisdiction 15 
Subject matter jurisdiction 14, 141 24 
Temporary restraining order denied 13 
Proposed amendments to NASD by laws 11 
Proposed tax shelter rules 120 
Sanction upheld 121 1211 
SEC hearmgs on NASD anti reciprocal rule 35 
Waiver of compliance with Act—Effect 148 
1389 4-18-90 Discipline of Members—§ 15A(b) 18,601 
[1125,601] [Discipline of Members] 
Sec 15A(b) 
.3 
(7) The rules of the association provide that (subject to any rule or order of the 
Commission pursuant to section 17(d) or 19(gX2) of this title) its members and persons 
associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of any provision 
of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder the rules of the Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board, or the rules of the association by expulsion suspension limitation of 
activities, functions, and operations fine censure being suspended or barred from being 
associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction 
001 Historical comment — 
For text of Sec 15A(bX7) in effect prior to 
December 1, 1975, see fl 25 590 001 
The provisions relating to discipline of members 
were formerly contained in Sec 15A(bX9) Prior 
to amendment by the Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 
12(2), effective December 1, 1975, 89 Stat 128, 
paragraph (9) of Sec 15A(b) read 
"the rules of the association provide that its 
ir,em^rs and persons associated with its members 
shall be appropriately disciplined by expulsion, 
suspension, fine, censure, or being suspended or 
barred from being associated with all members or 
any other fitting penalty, for any violation of its 
rules " 
Act of August 20, 1964, Sec 7(a), 78 Stat 575 
576, amended redesignated paragraph (9) of Sec 
15A(b), which formerly read as follows 
"the rules of the association provide that its 
members shall be appropriately disciplined, by 
expulsion, suspension fine, censure, or any other 
fitting penalty, for any violation of its rules * — 
CCH 
10 Expulsion from NASD—Revocation of 
registration—Free riding—The expulsion of a 
broker-dealer from the NASD membership, and 
the revocation of the registration of the member s 
president as a registered representative for viola 
tion of NASD rules (Article in, Section 1, NASD 
Manual G 23-4) against free riding was upheld by 
the SEC The president sold 500 shares of com 
mon stock, out of a 2,000 share participation in an 
underwriting of a public offering of such stock, to 
his wife —A J Gabriel Co, Inc, and Aaron J 
Gabriel (1965), 42 S E C 755, '64 '66 CCH Dec 
1177,283 
15 Contractual plana—"In-and-out" privi-
lege—NASD interpretation.—See f 25,591 122 
20 NASD Disciplinary hearings—Due pro-
cess requirements—Sanctions and costs— 
Imposition ot\ tuccesiot member—Cotzm 
(1974), Release No 34-10850, June 12, 45 S E C 
575, 4 SEC Docket No 12, p 420, 73-74 CCH 
Dec If 79,827 
.50 Members engaged in municipal securi-
ties business—1975 amendments.— 
Further changes in section 15A are necessitated 
by section 12 [now 13] of the bill establishing the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board and pro-
viding for regulation of the municipal securities 
industry As the only securities association regis-
tered pursuant to section 15A, the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers would be delegated 
inspection enforcement and other responsibilities 
by the bill Accordingly, this section of the bill 
would effect the changes in section 15A necessary 
to implement the purposes of the bill 
To broaden the NASD s responsibility and 
authority with respect to its members which are 
engaged in a municipal securities business this 
section of the bill would amend various provisions 
of section 15A Specifically, paragraph (7) of sec 
tion 15A(b) would be further amended to require 
that members and persons associated with its 
members shall be appropriately disciplined for 
violations of the rules promulgated by the Munici 
pal Securities Rulemaking Board 
Similarly, the traditional requirement that the 
association provide fair and orderly procedures for 
the discipline of members and persons associated 
with members referred to in section 15A(b) would 
be amended to extend these due process require 
ments in instances of violation of the rules of the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Further 
any final disciplinary action taken by the associa 
tion for such violations would be subject to review 
by the Commission in accordance with the proce 
dures prescribed in section 15A(h) 
The bill would also further amend subsection 
15A(e) of the Act to change the definition of the 
term non member for purposes of the authority 
granted to registered securities [association] to 
prohibit members by rule, from dealing with non 
members except at the same prices and on the 
same terms and conditions as are accorded to the 
general public Since the self regulatory organiza 
tion created for the municipal securities industry 
by the bill the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board, would not be a membership organization 
the revision to this important provision of the Act 
would effectively require all nonbank municipal 
securities dealers which participate in underwnt 
ing syndicates to join the NASD In this connec 
tion, syndicate and underwriting practices and 
the granting of any discounts, allowances or con 
cessions would be the subject of direct rulemaking 
by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
—Senate Committee Report No 94 75 (1975), 
page 112 
60 Burden of proof —The NASD s imposition 
of sanctions against a broker did not require 
reversal simply because the NASD did not apply 
a "clear and convincing" standard of proof since a 
preponderance of the evidence test was suffi 
Federal Securities Law Reports Law § 15A(b)(7) f 25,601.60 
EXHIBIT "Q" 
[ H 25,139] Comummotion of Securities Tronsoctions by 
Brolcef-Cfeolers When Trading Is Suspended 
Release No. 34-7920. July 19. 1966. 31 F. R. 10076. 
JB ) The relemse below h fated on the Uw in effect prior to the Securities Acts Amendments 
ofJ975.Sec. 12(k)st 123.371 consolidates former Sections 15<cX5) *nd 19(*X<) See 123.371.10. 
CCH 
17 C F R 241.7920. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission today made public a jwhey statement of 
its Division of Trading and Markets relating to the post-suspension consummation of 
securities transactions entered into by brokers and dealers before the Commission 
suspended trading in the security pursuant to Section I5(cX5) or Section 19(aX4) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. 
The text of the statement, issued by Irving M. Pollack, Director of the Division, 
foliows: 
"A number of questions have been presented recently as to whether, during the 
period when trading is suspended by order of the Commission pursuant to Section 
15(cX5) or Section 19(aX*) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a broker or dealer 
may complete (e.g., by payment or delivery) an agency or principal contract entered 
into prior to the suspension. 
"It is the position of the Division that where the broker or dealer is himself acting 
in good faith, where he is not connected with the activity announced by the Commis-
sion as a basis for suspension pursuant to Section 15(cX5) or Section 19(aX4). and 
where he has no reason to believe that his customer is so connected, no objection need 
be raised under such sections because the broker-dealer completes his contractual 
obligations in the particular transaction (e.g., by payment :br delivery) while the 
suspension is still in effect. The Division believes that in each such case, however, he 
should inform his customer, prior to consummating the transaction, that trading in the 
security is suspended and of the reasons announced by the Commission for suspending 
trading. 
44A broker-dealer, in deciding whether to consummate such a transaction, must of 
course consider not only the provisions of Sections 15{cX5) and 19(aX4) but also all 
other applicable provisions of the Federal securities laws/* 
[Release No. 34-7920. July 19,1966,31 F. R. 10076.J 
Federal Secori tk. Law Reports 17 CFR 241.7920 \ 25,139 
EXHIBIT 
" B " C0065 
EXHIBIT "R" 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65B 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am Jur 2d Injunctions sion of water by municipal corporation or pub-
N 10, 14, 48 to 52, 69 et seq , 265, 296 to 303, lie utility, 42 A L.R.3d 426 
310 to 316 Preliminary mandatory injunction to pre-
C.J.S. — 43 C J S Injunctions ^ 8, 16, 22 to vent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting 
24, 36 et seq ; 43A C J S Injunctions ^ 165, practices, 49 A L R 3d 1239 
166, 180, 206, 208 What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying 
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, en- refusal to honor, or injunction against honor-
forceability of covenant not to compete in, 17 ing, letter of credit under UCC *} 5-114(1), (2), 
A L R 3d 863. 25 A L.R.4th 239 
Appealability of contempt adjudication or Recovery of damages resulting from wrong-
conviction, 33 A L R 3d 448 ful issuance of injunction as limited to amount 
Review other than by appeal or writ of error, of bond, 30 A L R 4th 273 
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject Right of employee to injunction preventing 
to, 33 A L R 3d 589 employer from exposing employee to tobacco 
Propriety of permanently enjoining one smoke in workplace, 37 A L R 4th 480 
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from Propriety of federal court injunction against 
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in suit in foreign country, 78 A L R Fed 831 
question, 38 A L R 3d 572 Key Numbers. — Injunction «=> 9 et seq , 
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver- 143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary writs. 
(a) Special forms of writs abolished. Special forms of pleadings and of 
writs in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and 
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby abolished. Where 
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by 
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of the grounds set forth in 
Subdivisions (b) and (f) of this rule. 
(b) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: 
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exer-
cises a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, or an office in a 
corporation created by the authority of this state; or any public officer, 
civil or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the provi-
sions of law works a forfeiture of his office; or an association of persons act 
as a corporation within this state without being legally incorporated; or 
any corporation has offended against any provision of the law, as it may 
have been amended, by or under which law such corporation was created, 
altered or renewed; or any corporation has forfeited its privileges and 
franchises by nonuser or has committed an act amounting to a surrender 
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges and franchises or has 
misused a franchise or privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a 
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or 
(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial func-
tions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or 
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any inferior tribunal, or any 
corporation, board or person to perform an act which the law specially 
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or to compel the 
admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which 
he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior 
tribunal or by such corporation, board or person; or 
(4) where the relief sought is to arrest the proceedings of any tribunal, 
corporation, board or person, whether exercising functions judicial or 
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ministerial, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the juris-
diction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person. 
(c) Action by attorney general under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. 
The attorney general may, and when directed so to do by the governor shall, 
commence any action authorized by the provisions of Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule. Such action shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. 
(d) Action by private person under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. A 
person claiming to be entitled to a public or private office unlawfully held and 
exercised by another may bring an action therefor. A private person may 
bring an action upon any other ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule, only if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any such action 
commenced by a private person shall be brought in his own name. Upon filing 
the complaint, such person shall also file an undertaking with sufficient sure-
ties, in the same form required of bonds on appeal under the provision of Rule 
73 and conditioned that such person will pay any judgment for costs or dam-
ages recovered against him in such action. 
(e) Nature and extent of relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. 
Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the adverse party before 
issuance of the writ, or may grant an order to show cause why such writ 
should not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If the writ is 
granted, it shall be directed to the inferior tribunal, board, or officer, or to any 
other person having the custody of the record or proceedings, commanding 
such tribunal, board or officer to certify fully to the court issuing the writ, 
within a specified time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, describing 
or referring to them with sufficient certainty; and if a stay of proceedings is 
intended, requiring the party in the meantime to desist from further proceed-
ings in the matter to be reviewed. The review by the court issuing the writ 
shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal, 
board or officer has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or 
officer. 
(f) Habeas corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings shall 
be granted whenever it appears to the proper court that any person is unjustly 
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty. If the person seeking relief 
is imprisoned in the penitentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which 
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under 
the Constitution of the United States or under the Constitution of the state of 
Utah, or both, then the person seeking such relief shall proceed in accordance 
with Rule 65B(i). In all other cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall 
be conducted in accordance with the following provisions: 
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among other things, state that 
the person designated is illegally restrained of his liberty by the defen-
dant and the place where he is so restrained, if known (stating wherein 
and the cause or pretense thereof, according to the best information of the 
plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal process or giving a satisfactory 
explanation for failing so to do); that the legality of the imprisonment or 
restraint has not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding; whether 
another complaint for the same relief has been filed and relief thereunder 
denied by any court, and if so attaching a copy of such complaint and 
stating the reasons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory reasons 
for the failure to do so. 
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(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court most convenient to the 
plaintiff. 
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court shall, unless it appears 
from such complaint or the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled 
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding him to 
bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court at a time and 
place therein specified, at which time the court shall proceed in a sum-
mary manner to hear the matter and render judgment accordingly. If the 
writ is not issued the court shall state its reasons therefor in writing and 
file the same with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy thereof to the 
plaintiff. 
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he does not have such person 
in custody, the writ (and any other process issued) may be served upon 
any one having such person in custody, in the manner and with the same 
effect as if he had been made defendant in the action. 
(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or refuses admittance to the per-
son attempting to serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully to carry the 
person imprisoned or restrained out of the county or state after service of 
the writ, the person serving the writ shall immediately arrest the defen-
dant, or other person so resisting, and bring him, together with the person 
designated in the writ, forthwith before the court before which the writ is 
made returnable. 
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the court may, if it appears 
that the person designated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the 
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with the 
writ can be enforced, cause a warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and 
directing the sheriff to take such person and forthwith bring him before 
the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(7) The defendant shall appear at the proper time and place with the 
person designated or show good cause for not doing so and must answer 
the complaint within the time allowed. The answer must state plainly 
and unequivocally whether he then has, or at any time has had, the 
person designated under his control and restraint, and if so, the cause 
thereof. If such person has been transferred, the defendant must state 
that fact, and to whom, when the transfer was made, and the reason or 
authority therefor. The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form 
or misdescription of the person restrained or defendant, if enough is 
stated to show the meaning and intent thereof. 
(8) The person restrained may waive his right to be present at the 
hearing, in which case the writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a 
determination of the matter the court may place such person in the cus-
tody of such individual or individuals as may be deemed proper. 
(g) When counsel appointed for petitioner. Any person filing a petition 
for habeas corpus may be appointed counsel whenever the district court, upon 
examination of the petition, determines that the petition is not frivolous and 
that such person is financially unable to obtain representation. If the petition 
for habeas corpus is frivolous, the district court shall, without further action, 
dismiss the petition. 
(h) When writ returnable. Any alternative writ issued by a court or a 
judge thereof, may be made returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at 
any time as such court may in its discretion determine. 
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(i) Postconviction hearings. 
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary or county jail under a 
commitment of any court, whether such imprisonment be under an origi-
nal commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or 
parole, who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in hi.3 commit-
ment there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution 
of the United States or of the state of Utah, or both, may institute a 
proceeding under this rule. 
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing a complaint, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which such relief is 
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy of the complaint so filed 
upon the attorney general of the state of Utah if imprisoned in the state 
prison, or the county attorney of the county where imprisoned if in a 
county jail. Such service may be made by any of the methods provided for 
service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or by mailing such 
copy to the attorney general or county attorney by United States mail, 
postage prepaid, and by filing with the clerk of said court a certificate of 
mailing certifying under oath that a copy was so mailed to the attorney 
general or county attorney. Upon the filing of such a complaint, the clerk 
shall promptly bring the same to the attention of the presiding judge of 
the court in which such complaint is filed. 
(2) The complaint shall state that the person seeking relief is illegally 
restrained of his liberty by the defendant; shall state the place where he 
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and identify the proceedings in 
which the complainant was convicted and by which he was subsequently 
confined and of which he now complains; and shall set forth in plain and 
concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner in 
which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights were vio-
lated. The complaint shall have attached thereto affidavits, copies of 
records, or other evidence supporting such allegations, or shall state why 
the same are not attached. 
The complaint shall also state whether or not the judgment of convic-
tion that resulted in the confinement complained of has been reviewed on 
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate proceedings and state the 
results thereof. 
The complaint shall further state that the legality or constitutionality 
of his commitment or confinement has not already been adjudged in a 
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; and if the complainant 
shall have instituted prior similar proceedings in any court, state or fed-
eral, within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his complaint, shall 
attach a copy of any pleading filed in such court by him to his complaint, 
and shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief in such other court. 
In such case, if it is apparent to the court in which the proceeding under 
this rule is instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confine-
ment has already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the court shall 
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written notice thereof by mail to 
the complainant, and no further proceedings shall be had on such com-
plaint. 
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of authorities shall not be set 
forth in the complaint, but may be set out in a separate supporting memo-
randum or brief if the complainant so desires. 
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(4) All claims of the denial of any of complainant's constitutional rights 
shall be raised in the postconviction proceeding brought under this rule 
and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good 
cause shown therein. 
(5) [Deleted.] 
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of the complaint upon him, 
the attorney general, or the county attorney, as the case may be, shall 
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto. Any further pleadings 
or amendments shall be in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall immediately set the case 
for a hearing within twenty days thereafter unless the court in its discre-
tion determines that further time is needed. Prior to the hearing, the 
state or county shall obtain such transcript of proceedings or court records 
as may be relevant and material to the case. The court, on its own motion, 
or upon the request of either party, may order a prehearing conference if 
good reason exists therefor; but such conference shall not be set so as to 
unreasonably delay the hearing on the merits of the complaint. The com-
plainant shall be brought before the court for any hearing or conference. 
If the court in which the complaint is filed determines that in the 
interest of convenience and economy, the hearing should be transferred to 
the district court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement of 
complainant, the court may enter a written order transferring such case 
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so doing. 
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining the case, shall enter spe-
cific findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and 
the same shall be made a part of the record in the case. 
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it shall enter an appropri-
ate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceed-
ings and such further orders with respect to rearraignment, retrial, cus-
tody, bail or discharge as the court may deem just and proper in the case. 
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings, he 
may proceed in forma pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that 
effect, in which event the court may direct the costs to be paid by the 
county in which he was originally charged. 
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such complaint may be appealed 
to and reviewed by the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in civil cases. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1985; March 1, 1988.) 
Amendment Notes. — Former Subdivision 
(g), relating to proceedings where extraordi-
nary writs are sought in the Supreme Court, 
was repealed with the adoption of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1985. For present provisions, see Rules 
19 and 20, Utah R. App. P. 
The 1988 amendment added present Subdi-
vision (g) and deleted former Subdivision (0(5). 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal 
rule covenng the subject matter contained in 
this rule, except for Rule 81(a)(2), F.R.C.P., 
which applies the federal rules to proceedings 
for habeas corpus 
The federal statute governing remedies on 
motion attacking sentence appears at 28 
US.C § 2255. 
Cross-References. — Corporations, Title 
16 
Statute of limitations for habeas corpus ac-
tion, * 78-12-31.1 
Statute of limitations for postconviction re-
lief action, § 78-12-31 2. 
233 
EXHIBIT " S " 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Mark J. Griffin 4329 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
KAYCEE MCGINLEY 2187 
Securities Division 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE REGISTRATION OF 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
CRD NUMBER 7578 
A M E N D E D P E T I T I O N 
CASE NUMBER SD-89-46BD 
IN THE MATTER OF : 
THE REGISTRATION OF t A M E N D E D P E T I T I O N 
MARLEN JOHNSON S 
S 
CRD NUMBER 259888 : CASE NUMBER SD-89-47AG 
The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah ("the Division"), by and through its Director, John 
C. Baldwin, upon knowledge and belief, hereby complains and alleges 
as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The cause of action was investigated by the Division upon 
complaints that Marlen Johnson and Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. 
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("Johnson Bowles") have engaged in acts and practices which 
constitute violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (Title 61, 
Chapter 1, et sea., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) ("the 
Act"). 
JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction is vested in the Executive Director and the 
Securities Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce pursuant 
to § 61-1-6(1) of the Act. 
2. Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Executive 
Director, upon approval of a majority of the Securities Advisory 
Board, may by order deny, suspend, or revoke any agent or broker-
dealer registration if he finds that such order is in the public 
interest and the agent or broker-dealer: 
(g) Has engaged in dishonest or unethical 
practices in the securities business. 
3. Johnson Bowles is a securities broker dealer duly 
registered by the state of Utah under CRD registration 7578. 
4. Marlen Vernon Johnson ("Johnson"), CRD registration 
259888, is a registered securities agent by the state of Utah and 
principal of Johnson Bowles and acted as such at all times relevant 
to this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. On or about January 1988, Johnson, acting as an agent and 
principal for Johnson Bowles began effecting and attempting to 
effect transactions in the securities of USA Medical Corporation, 
a Wyoming corporation ("USA Medical"), whose securities were 
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offered and sold in the state of Utah. 
6. On or about February 16, 1989, Johnson Bowles, by and 
through its agent Johnson, filed suit in federal district court to 
obtain an injunction to prevent trading of in the securities of USA 
Medical. 
7. On March 1, 1989, in the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. v. USA Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. 
District Court, Central Division) the Court found: 
. that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
Further, that the stock of USA Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and 
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price 
of that stock in violation of the securities laws. 
8. On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary Order, 
(Case Number SD-89-030) denying the availability of all 
transactional exemptions from registration for the securities of 
USA Medical pursuant to the authority granted to the Division in 
§ 61-1-14(3) of the Act. A copy of the Summary Order was hand 
delivered to Johnson Bowles on March 1, 1989. The Order is and has 
been in effect continuously since its issuance on March 1, 1989. 
The Summary Order is attached hereto and made a part of these 
proceedings (Exhibit A). 
9. On March 1, 1989, the Division commenced an administrative 
action to deny the availability of all transactional exemptions 
from registration pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act for the 
4 
securities of USA Medical (Case Number SD-89-031). A copy of the 
Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to Johnson Bowles 
on March 2, 1989. 
10. Upon approval of the Securities Advisory Board, the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce accepted, 
confirmed and approved the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Default Order on March 27, 1989. The Default Order denied the 
availability of the transactional exemptions from registration 
contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act for the securities of USA 
Medical, any affiliate or successor to USA Medical or any entity 
subsequently organized by or on behalf of USA Medical. A copy of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order was 
mailed to Johnson Bowles on March 27, 1989. 
11. On March 31, 1989, the Division caused a letter to be 
mailed to Johnson Bowles restating the findings of the federal 
district court and the Division's Summary Order and Default Order. 
12. On or about April 3, 1989 through April 18, 1989, 
Johnson, acting in his capacity as an agent and principal for 
Johnson Bowles, attempted to effect or effected transactions in the 
securities of USA Medical as follows: 
a. On or about April 3, 1989 and April 13, 1989, Johnson 
contacted Mr. John Dawson, a shareholder of USA Medical, to 
purchase shares of USA Medical owned by Mr. Dawson. Johnson 
informed Mr. Dawson that such arrangement would be a 
handwritten agreement between Mr. Dawson and a New York firm. 
Johnson offered Mr. Dawson $.10 per share and instructed Mr. 
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Dawson to deliver his stock certificate to Johnson Bowles 
whereupon a check for the shares of USA Medical would be given 
to him. 
b. On or about April 6, 1989, Johnson purchased 12,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,200.00 from Sheldon 
and Lois Flateman in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
c. On or about April 14, 1989, Johnson purchased 18,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,800.00 from Richard 
Sax in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
d. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 80,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $8,000.00 from Paul Jones 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
e. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 69,500 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $6,950.00 from Nick 
Julian in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
f. On information and belief, the Division believes 
Johnson has purchased approximately 226,500 additional shares 
of USA Medical since March 1, 1989. 
COUNT I 
13. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 12 as specifically 
set out herein. 
14. Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Division 
may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration of a 
broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public interest 
and the broker-dealer: 
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(g) Has engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the 
securities business. 
15. The above described sales of USA Medical shares were 
sales effected without registration or exemption in violation of 
Section 61-1-7 of the Act. 
16. The actions of Johnson, in soliciting and/or purchasing 
the USA Medical shares during the pendency of the Division's order, 
encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7 
of the Act. 
17. The above actions of Johnson, acting on behalf of 
Johnson-Bowles, in soliciting, encouraging or aiding the violation 
of the Division's Order constitute violations of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
COUNT II 
23. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 22 as specifically 
set out herein. 
24. Section 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Act provides that the 
Division may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration 
of a broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public 
interest and that the broker-dealer "has engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the securities business." 
25. Rule R177-6-lg(a)(3) of the Division, promulgated under 
the authority of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of the Act, establishes that the 
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following acts and practices by broker-dealers constitute grounds 
for suspension or revocation of registration: 
"(3) Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale 
or exchange of any security without reasonable grounds 
to believe that such transaction or recommendation is 
suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry 
concerning the customer's investment obj ectives, 
financial situation and needs, and any other relevant 
information known by the broker-dealer." 
26. Johnson and Johnson-Bowles, as described above, 
recommended, solicited or effected for customers the sales of 
securities of USA Medical which sales would necessarily involve a 
violation of Section 61-1-7 of the Act. 
27. The above actions by Johnson Bowles constitute dishonest 
and unethical practices within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g) 
of the Act and Division Rule R177-6-lg in that transactions which 
involve a violation of the Act are not suitable. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. A finding that Johnson Bowles Company, Inc., engaged in 
the acts and practices alleged above; 
2. A finding that Marlen Johnson engaged in the acts and 
practices alleged above; 
3. That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Johnson 
Bowles Company, Inc. be adjudged and decreed to be found in 
violation of § 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and 
Rule R177-6-lg of the Division; 
4. That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Marlen 
Johnson be adjudged and decreed to be found in violation of § 61-
1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and Rule R177-6-lg of 
the Division; 
5, That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to 
act as a securities broker-dealer be suspended or revoked 
accordingly. 
6. That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to 
act as a securities broker-dealer be suspended or revoked 
accordingly. 
Dated this day of July, 1989. 
R. Paul Van Dean 
Attorney General 
Mark Z\ Griffin 
Assistant Attorney General 
EXHIBIT "T 
John c. Baldwin, Director 
Patricia Louie, Director of 
Registration 
Securities Division 
sshEEr,i$r&,2Business **^™ 
Post Office Box 45802 
Te£JS*ke Clty' U t a h 84145-4 5802 Telephone: (801) 530-6600 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OP THE DEPARTMENT OP BUSINESS REGULATION 
OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OP 
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION 
FILE NUMBER ST 1619 
SUMMARY ORDER DENYING 
AVAILABILITY OP EXEMPTIONS 
FROM REGISTRATION 
CASE NUMBER 6D-89-030 
Pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
(Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1983) ("the 
Act"), the Utah Securities Division ("the Division") has found that 
this Summary Order is in the public interest. It appears to the 
Division that: 
PINDING8 OP FACT 
1. S.M.I., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the state 
of Wyoming on January 12, 1979. On or about December 8, 1987, 
S.M.I., inc. merged with USA Medical Corporation, a Utah 
corporation. The surviving company is domiciled in the state of 
Wyoming under the name USA Medical Corporation ("USA"). 
EXHIBIT. *» 
2. The anti-fraud provisions contained in § 61-1-1 of the Act 
prohibits (1) employment of any device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud, (2) the making of any untrue statement of a material fact, 
or omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading and (3) engaging in any act, practice 
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person. 
3. Section 61-1-7 of the Act states that it is unlawful for 
any person to offer or sell any security in Utah unless it is 
registered or exempt from registration under § 61-1-14 of the Act. 
4. Offers and sales of the securities of USA have been made 
in the state of Utah during the period June 1, 1988 through this 
date. 
A. Failure to Register Securities 
5. A search of the Division's records indicates that a 
registration statement pursuant to 5 61-1-8, S 61-1-9 or $ 61-1-10 
of the Act has never been filed by USA with the Division. 
B. Failure to Qualify for Exemptions from Registration 
«• Section 61-1-14(2) of the Act contains several 
transactional exemptions from registration, including the 
exemptions commonly referred to as the "manual listing11 exemption 
contained in fi 61-1-14(2) (b) and the "secondary trading" exemption 
contained in § 61-1-14(2) (m) of the Act.
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7. On or about February 17, 1989, USA filed with the Division 
an application for confirmation of the availability of the manual 
listing exemption pursuant to § 61-1-14(2)(b) of the Act and Rule 
177-14-2b of the Division, However, the listing for USA contained 
in Moody1s OTC Industrial did not contain the minimal information 
required by § 61-1-14 (2) (b) of the Act and Rule 177-14-2b of the 
Division. Specifically, the listing did- not contain a profit and 
loss statement for either the fiscal year preceding the date of the 
balance sheet, or the most recent year of operations. By letter 
dated February 21, 1989, the Division notified USA that the filing 
was incomplete and that additional information was required. 
8. Section 61-1-14(2) (m) of the Act provides a transactional 
exemption for "(a]ny nonissuer transaction effected by or through 
a registered broker-dealer where the broker-dealer maintains in his 
records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person 
expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security 
with the broker-dealer information prescribed by the division under 
its rules and regulations.« 
9. Rule 177-14-2m of the Division sets forth the exclusive 
method of claiming the transactional exemption contained in { 61-
1-14(2) (m) of the Act. In particular the rule requires that 
specific information, i.e., a ••due diligence package11 be filed with 
the Division. A search of the Division's records does not reflect 
that USA has ever made a "due diligence'1 filing with the Division Q O O ^ * 
pursuant to Rule 177-14-2m of the Division. 
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C. Fraudulent Scheme to Defraud 
10. in the matter of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. v. USA 
Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court, 
Central Division) (March 1, 1989), the court found, after having* 
heard testimony on the matter, that: 
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
Further that the stock of USA Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and 
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price 
of that stock in violation of the securities laws. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Division hereby 
issues the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
11. Failure of USA Medical Corporation to register its 
securities, or claim an appropriate exemption from registration as 
provided in § 61-1-14 of the Act, is a violation of § 61-1-7 of the 
Act; 
12. Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical 
Corporation have been made as part of a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act; 
13. Untrue statements of material facts and omission to state 
material facts have been made in the offer and sale of the 
securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2) 
of the Act; and (}0063 
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14. Persons engaged in the offer and sale of the securities 
of USA Medical Corporation have engaged in acts, practices and/or 
a course of business which has operated as a fraud or deceit in 
violation of § 61-1-1(3) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, it is in the public interest to issue the following 
SUMMARY ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with the provisions set 
forth in § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, that the availability of any and 
all transactional exemptions contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act, 
be and hereby are, summarily denied. 
Pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, notice is hereby given, 
that within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a written request, 
this matter will be set down for hearing• 
DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1989. 
SECURITIES DIVISION 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
DIRECTOR 
EXHIBIT "U 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639 
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.. a 
Utah corporation and MARLEN V. 
JOHNSON. 
Petitioners, 
JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director, 
Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce, State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER. 
KENT BURGON. DAVID HARDY, 
MARGARET WICKENS, and KEITH 
CANNON, members of the Securities 
Advisory Board overseeing the 
Securities Division, 
Respondents 
MOTION TO REINSTATE OCTOBER 
27, EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 890906506CV 
Judge Sawaya 
Petitioners, by and through their counsel, hereby move the Court for an Order 
Reinstating the Court's Extraordinary Writ and Order dated October 27, 1989. an order 
which would have the effect of vacating Respondents' November 1,1989, Ex Parte Order 
Setting Aside Extraordinary Writ. The basis for this Motion is that the Respondents' 
November 1, 1989, Counter-Petition is misleading and a misstatement of the law and the 
facts. For this reason, the October 27, Writ and Order of this Court should be reinstated. 
Further, the Respondents' Ex Parte Counter-Petition evidences that Respondents acted in 
knowing contempt of Court on October 30, 1989, regardless of whether this Court 
subsequently set the October 27, Order aside. In support of this Motion, Respondents 
herewith file a Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
DATED this 2nd day of November, 1! 
;oombs 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 2nd day of November, 1989, (s)he 
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO REINSTATE OCTOBER 
27, EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND ORDER to Mark J. Griffin, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 
located at 115 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and mailed, postage prepaid to 
Craig F. McCullough, Esq., Co-Counsel for Petitioners, located at 10 East South Temple, 
Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director of Securities Division, 
located at 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802; and to M. 
TRUMAN BOWLER. Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 124 South 200 East, St. 
George, Utah 84770, KENT BURGON. Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 60 East 
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; DAVID E. HARDY, Securities Advisory Board 
Member, located at 215 South State Street, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2309; 
MARGARET WICKENS, Securities Advisory Board Member, located at 376 East 400 South, 
Suite 200, Salt Lake City. Utah 84111; and KEITH CANNON, Securities Advisory Board/ 
Member, located at 115 South Main Street. Salt L>*kp Ctift Utah 8 jK l \ . 
L:M0TI0N.l 
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EXHIBIT "V" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation and MARLEN V. 
JOHNSON, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director. Securities Division of the 
Department of Commerce. State 
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER. 
KENT BURGON. DAVID HARDY. 
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH 
CANNON, members of the Securities : 
Advisory Board overseeing the j : 
Securities Division, : 
Respondents 
: ORDER 
: CASE NO. 890906506CV 
The petitioner's motion to reinstate the extraordinary writ and order of this 
Court of October 27. 1989, and having been submitted to the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; the Court having reviewed the memorandums 
of the petitioner and the respondents and having considered the same and being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause further appearing, hereby orders that: 
1. Petitioner's motion to reinstate the extraordinary writ and order of this 
Court of October 27, 1989, is hereby denied. 
- 1 -
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2. There is no just reason for delay and this order is hereby entered as final 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this^£day of February. 1990. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
ames S. Sawa^4udge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 13th day of February. 1990. (s)he 
mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to Mark J. 
Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General, counsel to the Respondents, located at 115 State 
Capitol. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114; and Kathleen C. McGinley. Esq.. Director of 
Broker-Dealer Section. Division of Securities. Department of Commerce. Heber M. Wells 
Building, located at 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 
z:order.1 
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